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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the collapse
of the socialist-Communist system in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union, three countries from the former Warsaw
bloc gained worldwide attention to their transitions to
democratic systems. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
established democratic regimes shortly after their peaceful
transformations in the fall of 1989. Over a period of nearly
three years, the model of a liberal, west European type of
democracy with free market capitalism has been these
countries' guideline for creating more prosperous nations.
Eastern Europe swept aside the former systemic antagonism
that existed between democracy and communism and is moving
towards integration within the western world.
This process raises parallels to recent European
history. Merely twenty years ago, Portugal and Spain sought
their post-authoritarian future within the European
Community. In various aspects the Iberian nations
experienced problems similar to those currently existing in
Eastern Europe. Their economies were inefficient and were
forced to undertake an intensive process of modernization in
order to achieve competitive standards. With the advent of
democracy and capitalism, the people were confronted with a
change of their traditional way of life. Values and
1
attitudes shifted due to the implementation of a liberal
political system. The Iberian societies suffered from
decades of authoritarian rule. The democratic roots among
people and institutions were shallow. A democratic
commitment from elites and citizens, and a variety of
democratic associations and interest groups had to be
developed
.
The similarities to the current situation in Eastern
Europe are evident and therefore suggest a comparative
analysis. This study tries to draw conclusions for the
political processes in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
by trying to use the experiences of the two Iberian nations
as useful examples and a model for the Eastern European
transition towards democracy.
The research concentrates on the process of
establishing the new democratic regimes on a firm and
permanent basis. Among various aspects which are essential
to implement a stable democracy, the focus will be
exclusively on two significant threats: civil-military
relations and the requirement of a new security concept.
Due to its potency in terms of manpower and the use of
force, the military apparatus represents a potential threat
to any political regime. Thus, the integration of the
military into democratic society and the establishment of
civil supremacy constitutes an essential task for Eastern
Europe in order to reduce the internal risk of a military
2
coup and a return to authoritarian rule. The research tries
to develop a normative concept of civil-military relations
in a democratic system and asks, in what ways have the
Eastern European nations succeeded or failed so far, by
showing parallels to the Iberian cases.
Security threats impose a further risk for the
democratic transition. External threats, such as possible
challenges to the countries' geographical boundaries, border
violations or refugee problems arose from the civil wars on
the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the general
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the rapid but yet highly
unpredictable changes in the republics of the former Soviet
Union
.
With the implementation of democracy and capitalism,
various internal threats, such as a discontent with the
political system, the economic situation or ethnic tensions
are potential sources for instability. The study intends to
illustrate the various threats and possible capacities to
diminish or control them, set against the situation in Spain
and Portugal during their transitions.
The developments after autumn 1989 ended the forty-year
long division of Europe and the antagonism of two opposing
societal and economic ideologies. History offers Europe a
unique chance: the unification and integration of east and
west. Western outside powers have a key-position in this
3
process due to their economic and financial capacities and
the function of the west-European type of democracy as a
role-model for the new regimes.
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are reducing state
expenditures and controls, privatizing state-industries and
lifting restrictions on trade and investment. The political
system pursues a democratic path with the formation of a
pluralist party-system and the introduction of free
elections and democratic local and federal authorities.
These processes, however, cause hardship and provoke
political resistance from those who depended on state
protection and profited from the communist regime. The
transformation from communism to democracy represents an
economically as well as socio-polit ically unique historical
case. If those experiments fail, a return to authoritarian
regimes, including oppression of minorities, threats against
the western world and waves of immigrants will almost be
certain
.
The recent example of Lithuania shows that the path
towards democracy is far from being secured against
authoritarian setbacks. In November 1992, the Lithuanian
voters, confronted with severe economic difficulties
repudiated the Sajudis movement that brought them
independence. Instead, a party of former communists was
given a working majority in a new Parliament.
4
Fostering democracy in Eastern Europe is therefore not
only a moral duty but furthermore strategically logical.
Democratic countries do not go to war with each other or
sponsor terrorism. Democratic countries are more reliable
and open trading partners and offer more stable investment
opportunities. Democratic countries respect civil liberties,
rights of property and justice and are therefore more
reliable partners to build a safer and more prosperous
Europe based on peace and cooperation.
Therefore, the concluding part of the study tries to
demonstrate where help, advice and guidance by western
powers is needed. How can western powers assist and even
foster the integration process of the Eastern European
militaries? How can they support the development of a new
security concept to counterbalance the various threats?
The study focuses on the particular outside powers of
the European Community, its individual member states as well
as the United States. Again, the cases of Spain and Portugal
serve as a comparative base, trying to illustrate when and
under what circumstances western powers offered helpful
assistance or disclosed detrimental failures.
When thinking of the democratization processes in
Southern Europe in the 1970' s, one might ask why Greece is
not included in this study. This country also freed itself
from authoritarian rule in the mid-1970's. Greece
5
experienced a revolution from above. The military apparatus
-the key power-holder of the system- initiated the
transformation; a process comparable to that of Eastern
Europe where reformist factions of the communist parties
started the democratization. Also, as in the cases of
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Greece viewed the
European Community as a safeguard for the establishment of
democracy, as well as for social and economic enhancement.
But on the other side, the Greek experience with
authoritarian rule was simply too short to be valid for a
comparative study. In the years following World War II and
the German occupation the country suffered from a civil war.
In 1949 however, the communist forces were defeated and the
constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system was
reestablished. The military regime lasted only for seven
years. In the period between 1967 and 1974 the colonels
hardly managed to institutionalize authoritarianism and
failed to consolidate their power. 1 After the coup,
democratic attitudes, values, and practices were far from
being erased from the Greek society. This was a decisive
advantage for the democratization of Greece and a clear
distinction from Eastern Europe, where societies were shaped
and dominated by forty-five years of Communism, with people
being deeply affected by authoritarian rule.
1 Harry Psomiades, 1982, p.251
6
In Eastern Europe two generations grew up without
having any form of democratic experience. A tight
ideological framework and a complex security apparatus
dominated the individual and streamlined entire societies.
Thus, the building of a new democratic society is far more
complicated in such an environment. Democratic values, forms
of participation, simple cognitive aspects of pluralism need
to evolve. People have to learn to participate in the
transformation to a new system. This lack of democratic
knowledge was not present in the case of Greece.
7
CHAPTER II
THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION
A. The Research Agenda
For a stable democracy the integration of the military
apparatus into the society and its subordination to a
democratic executive is of vital importance. As Samuel
Huntington noted, the military is shaped by two forces: 2 a
functional imperative represented in the paramount task of
maintaining the nation's security and a societal imperative
where social forces, ideologies and institutions influence
the apparatus
. The interaction of these two forces are the
nucleus of civil—military relations. Various theoretical
aspects on this relation need to be mentioned.
1. Structural Antagonism
Structural problems between the armed forces and a
liberal-democratic society are manifold. According to
Huntington, the military emphasizes the importance of the
group as opposed to the individual. The efficiency of the
military requires the subordination of the individual. 3 The
core problem here is that the organization of the military
apparatus follows a strictly hierarchical "top-down" pattern
2 Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.2
3 see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.63
8
m order to maintain its combat capability. The individual
soldier has to obey orders and the organization has to keep
a high level of discipline to be effective. This contradicts
the liberal attitudes of a democracy which emphasizes the
self expression, primacy and value of the individual. Thus,
the individual soldier has to learn to separate his role of
citizen from that of soldier, while the overarching military
apparatus needs to provide the disciplinary frame.
Furthermore, to maintain the standard of an effective
army, the military needs to develop a certain amount of
integrity. Huntington's imperative of the military's
professionalism 4 (see II. A. 3) requires autonomy for the
apparatus to fulfill its purpose. Certain functions (see
II. A. 3) have to be performed exclusively by the military
without any civil intervention. The tendency and danger of
the formation of a state within a state is obvious. The
military's emphasis on obedience and loyalty, fostered by
its hierarchical structure and generated by its professional
function has the capability to form peculiar attitudes,
values and standards which do not necessarily reflect those
of the rest of the democratic society.
In addition, the apparatus has a practical as well as a
limited outlook on politics. 5 The military mind is more
concerned with military capabilities of other states than
4 see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.83
5 see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.64
9
with their political intentions. Its focus is on the
relation between political goals and military means, because
this directly affects security matters, which represent the
raison d'etre of the armed forces. This paramount concern
with national security results in the quest for the
strengthening of forces or budget increases
.
Finally, the military has several advantages over civil
organizations. According to S.E. Finer 6 the military is a
highly organized institution due to its centralized command,
its hierarchical structure, its discipline and its esprit de
corps. Especially in changing societies, such as those in
Eastern Europe, the military is often the best organized and
most disciplined organization 7
. The superiority to other
organizations is further enhanced by the military's monopoly
on arms and its superiority in the means of applying force.
2. Civil-Military Tensions
These structural contrasts between the civilian and the
military sector can under certain circumstances generate
into severe tensions and can impose a vital threat to the
political system. The conditions for this are as follows:
6 S.E. Finer, 1976, pp .
6
7 Constantine Danopoulos, 1988, p.6
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First, a cognitive change on how the military views its
own position in society: according to Amos Perlmutter, 8 a
feeling of inferiority can be caused by a defeat in war, by
a growing marginality of the military profession and a
general decline in the reputation of the officer status or
due to an apprehension that the civilian sector and
politicians intend to bring change to the military
organization and its status, which either pander to or
injure its pride as an autonomous organization.
Second, the economic status of the individual soldier
plays a decisive role. Skepticism towards a democratic
system is increased if the civilian sector is unable to
provide food and housing. As seen in the case of the German
Reichswehr
,
personal material security is often a reigning
concern among soldiers. In 1930, two junior officers were
convicted of distributing Nazi propaganda material among
fellow soldiers which was strictly forbidden by the
Reichswehr military code. One of the accused published his
motives
:
"The need for earning bread becomes all-important.
Soldiers turn into officials, officers become
candidates for pensions". 9
8 Amos Perlmutter, 1977, p.35
9 in: S.E. Finer, 1976, p.51
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A further example represents the current situation of the
Red Army of the former Soviet Union. 10 The departure of
forces from the Eastern European countries, the eastern part
of Germany and the Baltic republics is hampered by the
problem of providing housing or alternative jobs for those
affected by reduction measures. A political system which is
not able to provide a decent economic standard for the
soldier is likely be confronted with pressure from the
apparatus
.
11
Third, the apprehension of either military or civil
sector, that the other side is doing an unacceptable job in
securing national interests: tension can arise over such
issues as mismanagement of military matters, a denial of
resources or civilian interference in military decision
making. 12 Also, the military might be forced to intervene
in politics due to governmental failure. Corruption or
political disorder serve as examples. 13
see: Serge Schmemann: "The Red Army fights a Rearguard
Action against History",
in: New York Times, March 29, 1992, p.E4
11 These cognitive and economic intentions can be further
classified into various motives, such as class interest,
regional aspects, individual or corporate self-interest of
the army. For a more detailed discussion see:
S.E. Finer, 1975, p.20-53.
12 see: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9
13 Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9
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3. Objective Civilian Control and Professionalism
How can a civilian supremacy over the military sector -
an essential for a democratic system- be established? Samuel
Huntington discussed varieties of civilian control. 14 He
opposed the concept of subjective civilian control which
entails the maximizing of civilian power. The diversity,
varied character and conflicting interests of various
civilian groups would make it impossible to raise civilian
power as a whole as opposed to the military. According to
Huntington this idea would result in the maximizing of power
of certain civilian groups exalting in the supremacy of
"particular governmental institutions, particular social
classes and particular constitutional forms". 15 In
addition, the civilian supremacy would be guaranteed by
civilisnizing the military due to a denial of an independent
sphere for the armed forces.
But this qualitative enlargement of civilian control
and the reduction of military power could result in an
ineffective army and could undermine military security.
Thus, Huntington favors the concept of an objective civilian
control. Here, instead of civilianizing, the military would
be militarized, by maximizing its professionalism. This can
be accomplished by a clear delineation between political and
14 Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.80-83
15 Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.81
13
military roles, which would result in the military's
devotion to strictly military matters. It would preserve the
essential function of the army, increase military security,
and furthermore subordinate the military under civilian
supremacy by reducing its power "to the lowest level vis-a-
vis all civilian groups". 16
For Huntington, military professionalism consists of
expertness, social responsibility, which includes
information and advice to its client (i.e.the state) and a
corporate identity. 17 Like other professions, the military
develops its own identity and corporate unity due to its
unique task. This represents the solution for Huntington to
establish a civil supremacy. The more the soldier is engaged
in his own technical realm, such as maintaining a combat-
capability, technical handling of equipment, recruiting and
training, the less he is likely to get involved in policy
issues which do not directly affect him.
Huntington's concept however has significant
limitations. As Timothy Colton 18 pointed out, the concept
of professionalism cannot be precisely defined. Thus,
military professionalism and its special tasks vary from
culture to culture. Also a professional army does not
16 Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.85
17
see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, p.8
18 in: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.8
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automatically produce efficiency. Furthermore, the military
and civilian realm are not neatly separated. The provision
and design of equipment and the proper handling later on for
instance requires a cooperation between civil and military
institutions. In addition, civilian organizations exist
which are also interested in national security. Intelligence
services or academia are such institutions that influence
the security agenda of a country.
Furthermore, recent history provides an example of a
highly professional army,
-The German Reichswehr- which
intervened heavily in politics during the era of the Weimar
Republic. 19 The treaty of Versailles limited the Reichswehr
to a size of 100,000 men. This fostered the development of a
highly organized, disciplined, autonomous, and effective
body. Its interference in politics was consistent, driven by
an anti-socialist and anti-democratic creed. These attitudes
made especially junior officers receptive to Nazi-
propaganda. In 1923 and on several occasions from 1930
onwards, the army was in fact ruling Germany. Several
Presidents took advantage of Article 48 of the Constitution,
which gave the Head of State the authority to establish a
personal government in a the State of Emergency, backed by
military force. The "Reichswehr" showed that the provision
of an autonomous realm and military professionalism alone
are not sufficient to establish civil supremacy.
19 for detailed information see: S.E. Finer, 1976, p.26-53
15
Finally, according to S.E. Finer 20
,
military
professionalism tends towards a collision with the civilian
sector. A highly professional military regards itself more
as a servant to the state rather than to the government. The
corporate identity and self-consciousness of the apparatus
generates its own values and criteria for the notion of
national interest. The controversy between General MacArthur
and President Truman over the American involvement during
the Korean War serves as a classic example. This attitude
results in the perception that only the army is competent to
judge on military matters. An intervention of civilian
politicians in this realm can raise tensions, due to the
military's perception that the civil sector went beyond its
limits and competence.
Thus, the concept of objective civilian control and
military professionalism, whose primary goal is an effective
but politically less influential army, cannot by itself
establish civilian supremacy. Huntington's concept is not
the sole factor that inhibits the military from
intervention. Apart from this material aspect of civil
supremacy, from a clear definition of duties, authorities,
and responsibilities for both the civilian and the military
sector, the "military must also have absorbed the principle
20 for a more detailed discussion on these aspects see:
S.E. Finer, 1975, p.21-23
16
of the supremacy of the civil power". 21 Not only from a
formal, but also from a cognitive point of view must the
apparatus accept civilian rule.
—
The Civil-Military Relation: Formal Aspects
How can the civil-military relation be organized to
provide for the establishment of a stable democratic system?
As far as the functions of the military is concerned,
Huntington's concept of objective civilian control and
professionalism is valid. 22 Therefore, apart from being the
guarantor of national security, the military should provide
information and advice on military matters and has
furthermore an executive function in implementing state
decision. The military represents a purposive instrument,
with the task and commitment to serve the state. As
mentioned above, the military should be guaranteed a certain
autonomy in strictly military matters to maintain its combat
capability. This autonomy includes military training,
recruitment, and maneuvers.
The functions of the civilian sector are as followed:
Not too many civilian levels are to be found above the
general staff. However, in order to maintain an effective
functioning, civilians should have the decisive powers. This
21 S.E. Finer, 1975, p.24
22 see: Samuel Huntington, 1957, pp.72
17
must include approval of the general strategic and tactic
doctrines, decisions to go on/off alert and to begin/end a
war, setting of the budget, and ratification of military
law
.
In addition, further civilian checks on the military
can become necessary in order to prevent the development of
a state within the state. Such measures could include the
creation of a general civilian inspectorate of the army or
an office that should be responsible for complaints,
-both
of civilians as well as military individuals- and of the
compliance with civil rights and the military law. This
measure was taken by West Germany and helped to control and
integrate a military with a long authoritarian past into the
new democratic society.
Civilian politicians should also retain a "military
personnel role, reserving the right to select most senior
officers and to review appointments at lower levels". 23 In
addition, every soldier should be forbidden to run for any
political post to prevent double functions of political and
military assignments. This is a vital element for the
reduction of an internal threat represented by the military.
The apparatus should not be able to influence political
decisions apart from its own realm. The superiority of the
civilian sector has to be paramount.
23 Timothy Colton, 1990, p.9
18
5_; , The Civil-Military Relati on: Cognitive Aspspi- r
But legal and formal aspects do not represent the
entire concern m the principle of civil supremacy. As
discussed above, several factors can generate civil-military
tensions, including first an economic stringency, second an
alienation of the armed forces from society, third an
inappropriate governmental behavior in handling sensitive
and military-related issues, and fourth the mutual
perception of both sectors, that the other side operates in
an insufficient way.
The economic performance of the newly emerged
democracies remains crucial to the support and commitment to
democracy of any societal group, not only the military. This
vital aspect will be further elaborated in chapter III.
As for the aspect of an alienated army it becomes
obvious, that the military complex is in need of a new
ideological base. Although its authority was curtailed by
the former communist regimes (see II. B), the military still
had a clear perspective of its duties. But for a transition
to a stable democracy, the military apparatus needs to get
an entirely new function and responsibility. The apparatus
now, after the collapse of the former ideology and the
regime which it was reared to serve, has to redefine its
role as a servant to democracy, integrated within a
pluralist society and under civilian rule.
19
But the adaptation to a new mode of politics in a
democratic society is not one-sided. The civilian sector
needs to acknowledge that the armed forces are an integral
part of the democratic system. Its vital function as a
guarantor for the national security gives the military an
important position in the establishment of democracy. The
sector needs to establish a notion of respect and
acceptance of the autonomous realm of the armed forces in
military matters. In the former communist countries of
Eastern Europe, the military was clearly dominated by the
civil sector, (see II. B.) and its autonomy was often
relinquished for civil intervention.
Formal and legal aspects can channel the civil-
military relation in the political routine of day to day
procedures. Formality however must be accompanied by a
democratic attitude and the conviction that the existence of
both sectors as well as their cooperation are essential for
the establishment of democracy. Only with this cognitive
base is it possible to keep eventual civil-military tensions
on a level which still allows for political, non-violent
solutions
.
20
B^, The Mil itary Apparatus in Eastern Europe
What is the nature of the civil-military relation in a
communist system and in particular in the former communist
countries of Eastern Europe? For many years the dominant
explanatory model for civil-military relations in communist
countries has been a "totalitarian" approach, whereas the
party rigorously dominated the military with terror and
purges
.
24 In recent studies on the Soviet Union however,
scholars addressed the increasing role of the apparatus in
the decision making process. Although excluded and isolated
from politics under Stalin, the military emerged into a
legitimate interest group in the "golden age" of Soviet
civil-military relations under Brezhnev. 25 In addition,
although Gorbachev's policies gave priority to consumer
goods and civil technology, Glasnost still contributed to
the break up of military isolation from politics. 26
But the Soviet civil-military relations are not
universally transferable to every communist system. The
various degrees of authority and influence in such countries
as Cuba or the former Yugoslavia under Tito indicate that
general Soviet patterns are not necessarily valid for
Eastern Europe
.
see: Jonathan Adelmann, 1982, p.2
see: Timothy Colton, 1990, p.19-29
see: Thane Gustafson, 1990, pp.358
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However, the military in Eastern Europe was heavily
influenced by the Soviet hegemony in the communist bloc.
Military training and equipment had been standardized under
Soviet supervision. 27 The military doctrine of the Soviet
Union had over the years an increasing impact on Eastern
Europe, for its forces represented a vital element in the
case of a military confrontation in Europe with NATO. Thus,
the military capacities and the presence of Soviet divisions
constantly improved.
Furthermore, the aggressive Brezhnev Doctrine showed
that the Soviet Union was determined to prevent autonomous
national policies. The Damocles sword of a military
intervention of Soviet troops in internal affairs was always
hanging over the Eastern European countries.
A closer look however at recent historical events
indicates a critical relationship between the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. As noted by Dale R. Herspring, various
incidents showed that Eastern European militaries sometimes
were reluctant and counteractive to Soviet policies. 28 The
militaries of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia sought for
their own identities apart from being satellites for their
27
see: Ross Johnson, 1978, p.258
28 Dale Herspring, 1989, p.133-143
During the "Prague Spring" in 1968 Hungarian and Polish
troops showed little enthusiasm for the police action of
the Pact-forces. In Poland in the 1980's, despite the
imposition of martial law and the Solidarity movement, the
military remained mostly neutral. In Hungary in 1956, some
Hungarian units fought against Soviet troops.
22
powerful "brother". Bilateral and sometimes trilateral
cooperation among Eastern European armies increased in the
1970 's whereas the Soviet Union was only minimally
involved. 29 These events generated a skeptical attitude of
the Soviet Union towards its alliance partners with a
continued concern over Eastern Europe's loyalty and the
stability of its forces.
Also, the historic conditions for Eastern Europe in
establishing communist regimes differ sharply from that of
the Soviet Union. The communist system in the Soviet Union
emerged out of a revolution and the Red Army was shaped into
an effective body during the civil war. On the contrary, the
communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
suffered from a lack of support among the population.
Furthermore, the creation of a legitimate and effective army
in all three countries would have been a long process 30 due
to the need to incorporate various groupings with different
political backgrounds of a non-communist past. 31
29 Dale Herspring, 1989, p.139
30 see: Andrzej Korbonski, 1982, p.121
31 In Poland the following groupings had to be integrated:
- the Soviet-led Polish army founded in the USSR
- the Communist armed underground; the People's Army
- the non-communist armed underground; the Home Army
- members of the prewar Polish Army released from German
captivity
- members of the Polish army in the West who decided to
return to Poland after the war
in: Andrzej Korbonski, 1982, p.110
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These differing historic conditions imposed various
consequences on the Eastern European militaries. First, the
skepticism of the Soviet Union towards its WTO partners
resulted in a low standard of equipment among Eastern
European forces, 32 while better weapons went to other
regions such as the Middle East. 33 Therefore, the Eastern
European regimes had to rely on the Soviet Union for their
external security due to the lack of capable and effective
armies
.
34
Second, the distrust of the regimes towards the
military in terms of its political conformity with the
communist ideology resulted in a penetration and a control
by secret police forces. 35 The military apparatus was far
During the development of the new armed forces in
Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948, the officer corps
was extremely heterogeneous: Some communist sources even
lamented the "bourgeois" nature of the new cadre,
in: Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.131
In Hungary the organizers of the newly communist army had
severe problems in finding political reliable but also
well trained officers. The regime tried to circumvent the
personnel shortage by establishing a system of dual
controls which placed a political officer next to a
military commander,
in: Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.150
see: Dale Herspring, 1989, p.144-146
33 Ross Johnson, 1978, p.262
34 see
:
Jonathan Adelmann, 1982, p.ll
35 see Jonathan Adelmann, 1982, oo
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from being an autonomous actor, it was in fact under civil
domination of the Communist party. The civil supremacy was
absolute with the effect of an isolation of the military
from the decision making process. 36
In conclusion, the authority of the Eastern European
military was limited in two ways. On one side, the domestic
regimes curtailed its autonomy on the national level. On the
other side, the Soviet hegemony in the WTO provided for a
further restriction. The lack of identity and an ideological
base was evident. In defending their countries, the regimes
relied on an outside power - the Soviet Union. Furthermore,
the armies found themselves neglected actors in the
Political process, almost alienated from the political
system. Thus, an ideological identity was to a large extent
non-existent
.
This non-identity can now represent a positive factor
for the establishment of democracy. Now it is by far easier
for the Eastern European countries to develop a new
ideological base. Instead of being involved and integrated
into a military bloc, controlled and dictated by a
superpower and an aggressive (Brezhnev) doctrine, the
Eastern European militaries now can redefine their function
in serving their own countries. The possibility of a
reemergence of national pride, a notion of independence,
makes the militaries responsive to changes within the
36 Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.129
25
countries. The idea of change is paramount. The transitions
to democratic regimes provide these changes, making the
militaries receptive.
Again, a further remark on the importance of the
economic aspect seems appropriate. Although the Eastern
European militaries support the creation of new societies,
the amount of energy and approval of the democratization
processes will largely depend on a material security.
Without it, the current positive attitude towards the change
can turn into disappointment and a search for new concepts.
1 . Poland
Following the presidential elections in December 1990
and the parliamentary elections a year later, Poland
implemented various measures to establish a democratic
civilian rule over the armed forces and to reduce the
military threat to society.
Poland reduced its forces and equipment. 37 The
government emphasized the conversion to produce civilian
37 In the past three years, the Polish armed forces have been
constantly reduced. After a reduction of 33,000 soldiers in
1989, the overall strength in 1990 amounted to 314,000 men,
108,000 of them professional
. Reductions for 1990 included
450 tanks, 200 guns and mortars and 100 armored transports;
in: Harold Orenstein, 1990, p.66
In June 1991 the overall strength was 305,000 men (114,000
professionals); in: Europa, 1992, Vol.II, p.2250
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goods. The anticipated annual tank production for instance,
for the years 1991 until 1995 is expected to amount to only
thirty, as compared to a production capacity of 250.
In terms of institutional arrangements, the President
is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and is also the
head of the National Defense Committee that directs the
military in peace time. The Ministry of National Defense
executes the directives given to it by the Defense
Committee. 38 On the governmental level two new civilian
vice ministers of defense, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz
Onyszkiewicz were appointed in April 1990. 39 In December
1991, a civilian, Jan Parys, succeeded Vice Admiral Piotr
Kolodzie jczy, who had been in office since July 1990, as
Minister of Defense. 40
In addition, the Polish parliament introduced a bill
which banned professional soldiers from membership in all
political organizations and required conscripts to suspend
their membership in political organizations during their
time of service. 41 In an effort to reduce the communist
influence in the armed forces every political organ of the
former Communist party and all party organizations within
the army had been resolved. In addition, a fundamental
38 Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.273.
39 Harold S.Orenstein, 1990, p.71
40 in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430
41 in: Harold Orenstein, 1990, p.65
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apparatus took
recasting of positions throughout the
place. 4? Also, the withdrawal of armed forces from the
former Soviet Union should be completed by November 1992. 43
Furthermore, the Polish military set forth a new
ideological orientation. The constitution Act, article eight
notes, that "The Polish Armed Forces stand guard over the
sovereignty, security and peace of the Polish nation". 44
According to Poland's former vice minister of national
defense Bronislaw Komorowski, the "army must be
. . . an element
for securing Polish democracy". 45 Here, the army is trying
to reintroduce historic values which focus on honor,
tradition and the service to the nation, including a
depoliticization from Marxist traditions 46 which should
replace the former communist values and the ideological
orientation towards a confrontation with the West.
Thus, a complex restructuring process was imposed on
the military. The military-educational system was reformed
with the founding of the new National Defense Academy. The
new institution is directly subordinated to the minister of
defense, whereas the faculty members are military men. The
42 in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A430
43 Europa, 1992, Vol.II, p.2250
44 in: Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.269
45 in: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.72
46 see: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.72
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Academy emphasizes not only military aspects, but social
sciences are also integrated in the academic schedule, with
the aim of educating a future officer, who "consciously and
actively participates in the nation's sociological
processes"." Religion, which was oppressed in the days of
the "people's army" again is allowed to play an important
role. With the establishment of the position of a military
bishop ordinary/* the military respects the deep rooted
religious consciousness prevalent in society.
But the current situation is not as optimistic as it
might appear. The Polish military has problems in gaining
acceptance and respect among large parts of the population.
Although the military can look back on a long and glorious
tradition of service to the nation, the suppressions of
worker unrest in 1956 and 1970 and in particular during the
imposition of martial law under General Wojciech Jaruzelski
attributed to a skeptical and pessimistic view of the
military
. The attitude of the public could result in an
isolation of the military from society.
The prestige of the profession of a soldier has
decreased, elucidated by severe problems of the military in
attracting new recruits and officers. This tendency seems
remarkable against the background of high unemployment
throughout the country. The problem surmounted to such
47 in: Peter Podbielski, 1990, p.75
48 in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A434-438
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levels that the military worries about the fulfillment of
its functions in future years. Material reasons, such as
lack of housing and a scarcity of jobs for family members in
several
-often remote- garrison towns are regarded as the
main causes. 139
The economic prospect for the military appears rather
critical. The defense budget of 1990 was 20 percent lower
than that of 1987 (in real terms)
. Sixty percent was spent
on wages, maintenance, uniforms, and medical services. 50
In sum, Poland undertook a heavy reduction of its
forces in order to reduce the internal threat of political
pressure by the military. Several constitutional
arrangements account for the establishment of civilian
supremacy. Civilian influence within the armed forces and in
particular communist organs has been eased. The armed forces
are trying to find a new identity and ideological base,
grounded in democracy, religion, the defense of the country
and national heritage. This process is clouded by the lack
of acceptance of the military among the population and the
declining prestige of the military profession, which could
lead to an alienated army, whereas the military is not
incorporated into the democratic society. In addition, an
overall stringent economy and a further deterioration of the
49 in: Osteuropa, August 1992, p.A432-434
50 Jerzy Markowski, 1990, p.271
30
state finances can endanger the material standard of the
soldier. Thus, the military in Poland represents a threat to
the establishment of democracy.
2
. Hungary
Hungary made a rapid transformation from a one-party
rule of the Communist party to a multi-party democratic
system. But the political revolution of the late 1980 's
which ignited the democratization processes in Eastern
Europe hindered a careful elaboration of the country's
constitution. 51 Thus, a clear distinction of functions and
authorities between the political units is missing. This
"constitution-crisis" has also implications on the formal
aspects of civilian supremacy over the military. In a
decision on the authorities of the President, the Supreme
Court referred largely to military competence and tried to
adjudicate over differing interpretations of the
constitution
.
52
Thus, the Hungarian armed forces are led by their
commander in chief, currently General Lieutenant Kalman
Lorincz
. But the commander is dependent on the directives of
civilian authorities. In peacetime, the ministry of defense
represents the authority. In times of a crisis, the decision
51 see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A282
52 see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A285-A288
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to go on/off alert and the engagement of the armed forces in
both domestic and foreign conflicts belongs to the
government which needs a two-thirds approval from
parliament
.
Therefore, Hungary follows a traditional pattern of
civil supremacy, prevalent in other European states. The
military is given an autonomous realm in operating the armed
forces, whereas in political decisions which transcend the
realm of strictly military matters, civilian levels
represent the final authority.
In trying to reduce the former communist influence over
the apparatus, Hungary stressed a policy that seeks officers
who cannot be strongly identified with the country's
communist past for the highest military posts. In decreasing
the internal threat which the apparatus can impose on the
democratic system, the country undertook measures of
reductions in size, 53 set forth by the new defense policy
which is based on the assumption that smaller forces have to
be capable of providing for the national security. 54 In
addition, officers over 55 were being pensioned and 15 from
53 Total strength of the Hungarian armed forces:
1991: 86,500 (45,900 conscripts)
1988: 99,000 (64,000 conscripts)
Source: Europa, 1992, Vol.I, p.1329; 1989, Vol.I, p.1262
54 Osteuropa, May 1992, p.287
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the country's 39 generals in leading posts were retired
An increasing westernization of the Hungarian military
ideology can be recognized. A striking symbol is the
replacement of two MIG aircraft by F-16 airplanes, provided
by the United States." 6 In addition, a formal diplomatic
relationship with NATO was established through the Hungarian
embassy in Brussels. This policy represents a radical step.
Shortly after the overthrow of the communist regime, the
former member of the Warsaw Pact uttered its desire to leave
the organization by the end of 1991. In 1990, Hungarian
forces already stopped taking part in WTO exercises and in
June 1991 the last Soviet soldier left the country. Instead,
Hungary sought military cooperation with the West in the
fields of drug traffic and terrorism. The culmination of
this new orientation was the suggestion by the Defense
Committee of the Hungarian parliament in September 1990, to
send a battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the forces of the
United Nations in the wake of the Gulf war.
Hungary seeks for a modernization as well as a
reduction of its armed forces in order to create an
effective army for the defense of the country. This change
of perspective -from an aggressive WTO-doctrine to a
defensive character- is indicated by a statement of Defense
55 Stephen Bowers, 1991, p.287
56 in: Stephen Bowers, 1991, p.288
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Minister Lajos Fur who sees the base of the Hungarian
security in diplomacy and politics, whereas the military is
for the sole purpose of defending the national
sovereignty
.
57
The attitude of the Hungarian population towards the
military is one of skepticism. The armed forces are further
confronted with a "historical lack of legitimacy"... and
with a "powerful antimilitary sentiment in society". 58 The
respect towards the soldier decreased constantly throughout
the communist period. Although some units fought against
Soviet troops in the uprising of 1956, the military as a
whole stayed out
. And although the apparatus held a
skeptical attitude towards the intervention in
Czechoslovakia in 1968, it still never challenged the
political authority. Its political significance was minor,
indicated in the fact that Hungary never had a minster of
defense on the Politburo. 59 Instead it followed the party
directives and showed little interest in the political
process . 60
To integrate the military into an integral part of
society it is vital for the armed forces to regain a
57 in: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281
58 Keith Crane, Steven Popper and Barbara Kliszewski, 1990, p.3
59 Keith Crane, Steven Popper, Barbara Kliszewski, 1990, p.5
60 for an historical background of the Hungarian military see:
Ivan Volgyes, 1978, p.145-158
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respected social status. The conditions are present, despite
the experiences during the dark ages of Communism. Like its
counterpart m Poland, the Hungarian military has a long
tradition with a certain pride in serving the country, it
remains necessary for the civil sectors of society to
further foster the process of an integration of the
apparatus. The military found a new ideological base in the
defense of the country and an orientation towards a
cooperation with the West. But for a full integration, the
Hungarian society needs to be aware that an alienated army
imposes a severe internal threat to democracy. Therefore a
cognitive turnaround is necessary. Hungary needs to develop
an attitude that the military is a vital element of a
democracy with its important function as a guarantor for
national security.
In sum, Hungary took important measures in establishing
civilian supremacy. The country reduced communist influence
over the military and further diminished a possible internal
threat imposed by the military on democracy by a reduction
in size. Cooperation with NATO and western countries and the
sole purpose of the army to defend the country has the
capacity to serve as a new ideological base, whereas the
forced retirement of former army generals indicates a
further break with the past. Despite these positive
developments, the danger of an alienated army is still
35
present due to a skeptical attitude of large parts of the
population
.
3. Czechoslovakia
Since the "Velvet Revolution" in December 1989 the
country implemented a variety of reforms to incorporate the
military into the democratic system and to guarantee
civilian rule. The Defense Act of 14 March 1990 notes that
soldiers in active service, except soldiers summoned to
military exercises, have their membership and activities in
political parties and movements suspended". 61 A "Czech Army
Council on Cooperation with the Public" was introduced with
the task to pay attention to the individual's right on
security interests and the influence of interstate ethnic
relations on national security issues.
A civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky, replaced General Miroslav
Vacek as defense minister in October 1990 to reassert
civilian control. In addition, the position of a general
inspectorate for the army was created. The inspectorate,
independent from the ministry of defense and chosen by
parliament, cooperates with civilian representatives and
consults with the ministry of internal affairs and the
ministry of defense. The task of the new agency is to
61 The following set of reforms is drawn from:
Timothy Thomas, 1991, p.47-52
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control reorganization, modernization and professionalism of
the military.
Also former President Havel intended to make the
defense budget information public, by reporting it to the
Parliamentary Military and Security Committee". In
addition, the military office of the President is in charge
of ensuring communication between the President and the
ministry of defense. Finally, the military office of the
President is responsible for letters from the public,
concerning military affairs.
Czechoslovakia is undergoing heavy reductions in size
and a process of restructuring. Through 1992, the country
will reduce the forces to 130,000 men, down from an overall
strength of 208,000 soldiers in 1 988. 62 Until 1996 a
professionalization of 50 per cent is planned. 63 The
defense budget was cut by 40 per cent (adjustment of
inflation) in 1990 from 35.6 billion to 31 billion koruny.
Expectations accounted for 26.5 koruny by the end of 1991.
To ease the tensions between the civil and military
sectors of society, conscript service was reduced from 24 to
18 months and will be even further cut to 12 months in late
1993. Further innovations are a civilian service option (27
month)
,
new food allowances, longer leave time and the
introduction of religious services. The overall goal is to
62 in: Europa, Vol.I, 1989, p.836
63 Timothy Thomas, 1991, p.52
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make the military service more humane, thus preventing a
negative attitude of the people and especially of the
conscripts towards the military
-a step towards an
integration into the new society. To foster the achievement
of this goal, the ministry of defense "Educational and
Cultural Administration" was founded in 1990 to further
reduce the gap between military and society. The institution
is responsible for formulating and implementing state
educational and cultural policies in the army.
In providing a new ideological base for the military,
the CSFR formulated its own doctrine, based on the premise
of a "reasonable defensive sufficiency". 64 As opposed to
the former doctrine, dominated by the military staff,
influenced and even corrected by the Soviet military, the
new ideology is defensive and non-aggressive. But the
provision of a secure cognitive base within the realm of a
democratic society is as yet incomplete. The military's
performances in recent history made the people skeptical
towards the military. This attitude is indicated by the
numerous civilian checks on the apparatus.
During the era of the Warsaw Pact, the Czech military
was overpowered by the Soviet dominance. Also, in
confrontational situations such as Hitler's invasion in
1939, the Prague Spring in 1968 as well as during the
64 Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
in: Timothy L. Thomas, 1991, p.53
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restraint. In
"Velvet Revolution", the military acted with
addition, according to Jiri Valenta, 65 the country can be
described as "simply antimilitary... where the use of force
runs contrary to the state's cultural values".
The recent reluctance of the military in defending the
country, supporting democracy and its past association with
an unpopular communist regime make the process of
integration difficult. The task is to develop an ideological
base, consisting of the pride to protect the country's
sovereignty as well as a changing of the public's attitude,
which currently regards the military as "subservient,
expensive and useless. 66 It will further reduce the gap
between civilians and the military and will provide for a
cognitive integration
-in this case the recognition of the
necessity of the armed forces- into the democratic society.
The recent discussion over the future of the country,
whether it be as a loose union or as two independent and
separate states 67 further increases the uncertainty of the
status of the military. It remains essential to exclude the
military from this controversy. An involvement in this
dispute could result in a civil war, with units taking a
position on either the Slovak or the Czech side. The federal
65 Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.130
66 in: Jiri Valenta, 1982, p.130
61
see: New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3
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government showed sensitivity and political wisdom in
rejecting the use of force against possible separatist
movements in Slovakia and to prevent an involvement of the
army in solving ethnic conflicts. 68 It seems as if Czechs
and Slovaks will handle this precarious situation without
any use of violence, further stressed by the fact that
historically military conflict between these two ethnic
groups is nonexistent. But the rising tensions might serve
as a breeding ground for military intervention if the
situation remains unstable and unclear.
In sum, Czechoslovakia made important steps towards an
integration of the military into the democratic society. The
constitution as well as the political praxis provide for
control over the apparatus. A variety of measures
were implemented to ease the tensions between the civil and
the military sectors of society. The internal threat of
political pressure or even a coup was limited with a
reduction in size.
The cognitive integration is as yet incomplete.
Skepticism of the population towards the armed forces
prevails, while an incorporation into the society is further
hindered by an uncertainty over the country's future which
68 Havel on "Radio Free Europe", 25 March 1991, in:
Timothy L. Thomas, 1991, p.51
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could generate emotions of dissatisfaction on parts of the
military with the democratic development.
C. The Military in Spain
JU. The Position in the Authoritarian Regime
In the Franco system the military was the main
stabilizing force of the regime. The apparatus formed a
closed institution within the state, entirely isolated from
the processes of liberalization and democratization
occurring in the late years of the dictatorship. As Benny
Pollack describes it,
the armed forces had been almost completely cut off
from progressive, modernizing sectors of Spanish
society and remained the staunchest defenders of the
traditional order,
. . . ideologically saturated by the
anti-liberal, anti-democratic value-system of the old
regime"
.
69
During the dictatorship, the apparatus was the center
of political life, 70 the source for the country's unity and
stability. In the beginning of the democratization process,
the military was unable to adapt to the new system. It
maintained an isolated status and found it difficult to
confront the rising problems, such as crime, terrorism,
69 Benny Pollack, 1987, p.156
70 Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.18
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autonomy claims by various regions, or societal changes such
as the new laws on abortion or divorce. This anti-democratic
attitude can be further explained by the loss of the
powerful role that the military previously occupied in the
Franco-regime. One-third of all Franco's ministers were Army
officers. In contrast, only one officer held a position in
the Government of 1978. 71
2. The Transition and Reforms
The new Spanish democracy initially failed to
incorporate the military. The military's skepticism towards
the new system and the government's struggle to control
crime and terrorism culminated in the coup attempt on
February 23, 1981. The putsch failed due to disagreeing
sections in the Army and the firm action of King Juan Carlos
and his support for the constitution and the parliamentary
system. However, not only in 1981 but also in 1978 and in
1982 was the Army involved in attempted coups.
After 1982 things changed. With the socialist
government of the PSOE in power, backed up by a clear
majority in parliament and not as fragile as the former
71 Although the military's influences on politics decreased
significantly, the apparatus still held the important
position of First Deputy Prime Minister, who was
responsible for Defense and Military matters. This position
was taken by Lt. General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado;
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, London, 1979, p.1110
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Christian Democratic (UCD) governments, the civil sector of
society gained control over the military.
In 1981, one year before the PSOE came to power, the
Army was still heavily overstaffed. Its size even increased
compared to the last year of the Franco regime. 72 At the
center of the problem was the officer corps. Although in
1978 the UCD government abolished the guarantee that every
officer would end his career with at least the rank of
brigadier general, he still had the right to reach colonel.
Thus, promotion was based on age rather than ability.
Furthermore, Spanish officers tended to be ten years older
on average than other NATO officers. 73 Thus, the impact of
younger military officers who were brought up during the
opening to western ideas and democracy was still kept to a
low level. This was especially important, for elder officers
served under the Franco regime and tended towards former
traditions and privileges.
The Socialist government undertook an ambitious and
costly program of reorganization and modernization of the
military. Its intention was twofold: first, to neutralize
the apparatus as an internal threat and second, to bring the
72 Total strength of the Spanish armed forces:
1975: 302,000, compulsory service of 18 months.
1981: 342,000 compulsory service of 15 months.
in: Europa, Vol.I, 1976, p.1069 and Vol.I, 1982, p.1076
73 The Economist: 20 February 1988, p.48
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military up to NATO-standards
,
which Spain joined in the
summer of 1982. in addition, since the military budget was
not affected by the heavy austerity measures imposed by
Prime Minister Gonzales, spending on armaments soared, a
reflection of the government's policy to increase
technological standards. This happened also to please the
military. As a natural reaction, an organization will be
more supportive of a country and its government when it
represents a chief beneficiary of modernization programs.
Technological modernization in this case fostered the
integration of the apparatus into democracy. The defense
budget of $6.6 billion or 2.3 % of GDP in 1987 however was
still below the modest average of the European members of
NATO (3.4%) 7,1 . The ambition of the government was a
reduction in size by 30 per cent until the year 2000, by
reducing the period of service for conscripts and by
pensioning off 25 per cent of the senior officers 75 to
reduce the number of elder officers who previously served
under Franco. As of June 1990, the total strength of the
armed forces amounted to 274, 500, 76 a reduction of 22 per
cent since 1978.
74 Economist: 20 February 1988, p.49
75 Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.19
76 in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.II, 1991, p.2408.
The military service was still compulsory, lasting 12
months (to be reduced to 9 months during 1992)
.
Conscripts
totaled 200, 900 .
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The constitution, approved by a popular referendum on
December 6, 1978 inscribed the dominance of the civilian
sector. The King holds the position of the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Supreme Council of
Defense. The Declaration of war and peace is announced by
the king under the prior authorization of the Cortez, the
Spanish parliament. A further step towards civilian
supremacy was accomplished in 1982, when the Socialist
government refused to give positions in the Cabinet to
military officers. 77
Furthermore, the integration in the North Atlantic
Alliance (see also III.B.2) further bolstered the fragile
democracy by giving the armed forces an external orientation
and a role to play outside the country, thus keeping them
out of internal politics. Multilateral cooperation and
consultation are essential for NATO to maintain its security
function. To achieve this goal, not exclusively civilian
politicians but also military officers are integrated in the
decision-making process. Issues concerning the modernization
of technical equipment, strategic questions, or maneuvers
require the involvement of the individual member states. The
step towards NATO therefore represented the creation of a
new ideological base for the Spanish military. The apparatus
was now able to identify a common enemy and ceased to think
entirely in internal terms, a role which they formerly
11
see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1083-1085
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was a
Played under the Franco regime. This transformation in
ideology was vital for the securance of democracy, it
shift from the center of the political life to contributing
to the defense of the Alliance's southern flank.
In short, Spain was confronted with various
difficulties in integrating the military into a democratic
society. After Franco's demise, the apparatus maintained its
position as a closed institution within the state with anti-
democratic and anti-liberal attitudes. In the initial period
of the transformation, the military was still dominated by
older Franco-officers who obstructed an adaptation to the
progressive and modernizing developments in the Spanish
society. This opposition to democracy represented an
internal threat to the new political system, illustrated by
various coups in the early 1980 's. Spain responded with a
reduction in size of the military and a pensioning off of
senior officers. Constitutional regulations accounted for a
civil supremacy. In providing a new ideological base and a
distraction of the military from internal political matters,
Spain achieved an incorporation into NATO, subsequently
followed by a technical modernization.
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P. The Military in Portugal
1^. The Position in the Authoritarian
There were striking differences in the role of the army
in the two Iberian nations during the transition period. In
Spain, the military stood on the sidelines, while the
gradual implementation of a democratic system was the result
of negotiations between democratic opponents of Franco and
his successors
.
18 In Portugal, the army initiated the
breakdown of the old system. The Spanish army represented a
threat to democracy, while the Portuguese military directed
the process of democratization. In Spain, the army was a
rightist force while in Portugal it was leftist.
After the death of Antonio Salazar in 1970, his
successor Marcello Caetano was incapable of leading Portugal
out of an economic and political crisis. The coup of April
25, 1974 was triggered by two precipitant s . An economic
recession drove up prices, created social unrest 79 and made
people responsive to changes. The costs for Portugal of
fighting wars in Mozambique and Angola outweighed the
economic advantages of retaining the colonies. A country
with less than nine million people was sustaining an army of
200,000 men, while from 1969 to 1974, almost 40 per cent of
Portugal's GNP was spent for military expenditures. 80 In
78 Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.241
79 Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.235
80 World Military and Arms Transfers, 1980, p.64
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addition fractions of the armed forces were strongly opposed
to the dictatorship. Caetano was incapable in offering a
solution to break the deadlock situation in Africa.
The impact of ten years of colonial warfare in Africa
was severe on the soldiers. Officer training for all
candidates included exposure to the revolutionary ideology
of potential adversaries. 81 The military service abroad
broadened the horizon of military men, who became aware of
the social, economic and political malaise at home.
These events generated the formation of a dissident
organization, the Armed Forces Movement (AFM)
,
a group of
basically middle-ranked junior officers who executed an
almost bloodless coup. The significance of the April coup is
that no political party or ideological movement was
involved82
. The revolution was entirely initiated by a
faction of the military. The response of the public was
extremely positive. The AFM found a wide base of support
among the people, who welcomed the change from years of
dictatorial rule. As Kenneth Maxwell noted, "in Lisbon and
Oporto, thousands of people poured into the streets and
welcomed the army as liberators". 83
81 James John Tritten, 1979, p.58
82 James John Tritten, 1979, p.60
83 Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.231
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2l-z—The Transition and Reforms
After the coup, the military was able to keep a strong
influence on politics. Until the end of 1975, the political
vacuum left behind by the Caetano regime was filled with six
provisional governments. These changing types of governments
ranging from West-European pluralism to East-European
socialism were not the result of a broad revolutionary
movement, led by the AFM or any political party, but the
maneuvering of different elite factions within the army
which tried to gain control over an unstable political
situation while being uncertain over the type of regime to
be chosen.'* 1 The military represented the core of any
political action. By that time, no political party and no
broadly based revolutionary movement had the capability of
directing the democratization process.
With the sixth provisional government, military
discipline was finally restored85 and a faction, led by
General Antonio Ramalho Eanes gained power. Eanes saw
Portugal's future in the realm of a civilian dominated,
western-type democracy. With the election of a constituent
assembly and a new constitution which was enacted on 25
April 1976, the power gradually shifted to civilian rule.
But the military was still strong enough to determine the
shape of the constitution. Although the document was the
84 see: Walter Opello, 1985, p.65-82
85 Walter Opello, 1985, p.74
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work of civilian political parties, left-wing officers had
such an impact that Portugal's new constitution represented
the "most radical in the western world". 86 Article 2 is a
clear indication, for it pledged the country to ensuring
the transition to socialism by creating
the conditions for the democratic exercise
of power by the working classes". 87
In addition, article 273 gives the armed forces "the
historic role of guaranteeing conditions which allow the
peaceful and pluralist transition of Portuguese society
towards democracy and socialism". 88 Furthermore, the
document declared that education should promote a "classless
society and that political parties should participate in
the revolutionary process. 89
The Constitution incorporated a pact between the
military and the major political parties which further
documented the influence of the military to civilian rule.
Under the pact, signed on February 26, 1976, the influence
of the army in the political process was concentrated in a
"Revolutionary Council". The 18-man council, headed by the
President (who could be either civilian or a military
officer) and composed of members of the armed forces, left
86 Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203
87 in: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203
88 in: Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.7.
89 see: Lester A.Sobel, 1976, p.138
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decisive political powers to the military. The Council
functioned as a advisory organ to the President and judged
the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the National
Assembly. Thus, it opposed attempts to privatize the
economy. 90 in matters concerning defense as well as
nationalizations the council had the power to veto over all
legislation. 91 These supreme powers were finally
relinquished in 1982, when the Council was abolished by a
two-thirds majority in parliament and replaced by a mainly
civilian Council of State.
The new Portuguese democracy was confronted with a
military apparatus that had a significant impact on
politics, backed up by a certain popularity among the
people, while factions of the army obtained a revolutionary
attitude. Therefore, the influence of the apparatus had to
be decreased in order to create a stable democratic system
based on civilian rule.
Portugal responded with a severe reduction in size. The
army was scaled down from 200,000 in 1974 to under 40,000 in
1 980. 92 Conscription existed, but with many exemptions,
while the time of duty was cut down as well. The draft is
see: Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.243
91 Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.203
92 Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.243
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now primarily used as an instrument of education, by
applying it largely in areas where schooling is poor. 93
Furthermore, the various Portuguese governments
succeeded in pushing radical officers of the AFM out of the
political and military realm of significance. The
politicized units which were involved in the various
quarrels for power in the two years following the coup have
been disbanded. 94 Most of the AFM officers have been
investigated, arrested, transferred to the reserves, or
forced to resign. Others have been moved from command posts
to the administration level. 95 The revolutionary element of
the apparatus was further extinguished through a return to a
traditional, more disciplined structure. In this context,
the AFM general assembly - the soldiers' parliament - was
replaced by a hierarchical command.
Portugal heavily cut its defense budget. In 1974
military expenditures amounted to 919 million dollars (6.8
per cent of the GNP ) while the figures were 649 million
dollars (3.5% of the GNP) in 1978. 96
Another key element for the integration of the military
into a democratic society represented the provision of a new
ideological base for the military. Over ten years the
93 see: Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.9
94 Economist May 28, 1977, Survey p.9
95 Stephen Talbot, 1980, p.272
96 World Military and Arms Transfers 1969-1978, 1980, p.64
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Portuguese army was involved in colonial wars in Africa. As
Douglas Porch noted, throughout the years of the Salazar
regime, "indignation among many officers over the
authoritarian nature of the state" 97 increased. The
military fulfilled its function of serving the state, but
the army "tolerated rather than supported the
government". 98 Thus, the state of mind of the military
complex was ambivalent. The notion of the nation's glory and
imperial tradition was in contrast to the political
involvement in shaping the new regime, whereas a radical
part of the apparatus addressed political issues and played
a vanguard role in the Revolution.
Here, Portugal succeeded in promoting a new role for
the army in the defense of its continental territory and the
securance of the democratic system. As General Eanes said,
"the Army exists only to defend national interests, and to
guarantee the institutions established by the freely
expressed will of the people through their votes". 99
The revised constitution of 1982, initially promulgated
on April 2, 1976 further stresses the new function of the
military within society: "the Portuguese Armed Forces shall
97 Douglas Porch, 1977, p.22
98 Douglas Porch, 1977, p.23
99 Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.7
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safeguard national independence, unity of the State and the
integrity of the national territory". 100
It was vital for Portugal, to direct the concern of the
military apparatus on external matters. With the
independence of the former African colonies, Portugal was in
desperate need for redefining the role for its military.
Despite the securance of the State and therefore of
democratic institutions, the Army should be kept out of
internal politics. This goal was achieved through a further
integration into NATO, which kept the armed forces occupied,
and by reducing the temptation of political intervention. In
the aftermath of the revolution, the Alliance feared that
Portugal might fell under communist influence and therefore
excluded the country from its sensitive nuclear planning
group. 101 Today, Portugal has rejoined this committee. 102
Furthermore, the Constitution manifests the superior
role of the civilian sector over the military. Changes in
the Constitution require a two-thirds majority. The budget,
including the military budget needs to be approved by a
majority of the assembly which also approves treaties. In
1982, military personal disappeared from posts in the
government which was now entirely composed of civilian
100 in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1027
101
see: U.S. News and World Report, June 30, 1980, p.23
102 for a further discussion on the relationship towards NATO
see chapter IV.B.l
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politicians
.
103 The council of the Revolution was
completely abolished by transferring its functions to
several organs. 104 In 1986, the Presidency has been finally
turned over to a civilian, former Prime Minister Mario
Soarez. This represents a remarkable step towards the
establishment of civilian supremacy, for the Presidency,
equipped with significant powers 105 has traditionally been
the preserve of the armed forces. 106
In sum, the Portuguese democracy decreased a possible
internal threat of the armed forces. The Military initiated
and directed the transition towards democracy. Over almost
two years following the coup, Portugal was the plaything of
some politically inexperienced officers. Only the seizure of
factions within the military devoted to democracy provided
for a gradual takeover by civilian leaders, who responded
with a reduction in size and budget, the promotion of a new
ideological base, and the exemption of radical officers from
103 see: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, pp.1027
104 the following organs took over the powers of the Council of
the Revolution:
Council of the State (new)
,
the President, the Government
the Constitutional Tribunal (new consisting of 13 judges)
,
the Assembly, the Council of National Defense,
in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1983, p.1013
105 The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister,
sets dates for elections, has the right to dissolve
Parliament and presides over the Council of State,
in: Europa, Vol.II, 1991, p.2204
106 see: Douglas Porch, 1977, p.24
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significant posts. With the revision of the constitution,
the Revolutionary Council" dissolved in 1982, and a
civilian President, civilian authority was further
established
.
But still, the military represents a threat to
democracy. As Tom Gallagher noted, "traditionally, many
officers have viewed the army as an agency which has a duty
to intervene in political life if the parties abuse the
mandate they have received from the electorate". 107
Although a fragmentation of the party system, a difficult
economic performance over a longer period that would augment
social unrest and which would give the military the
opportunity to intervene seems to be a worst-case-scenario,
military tensions should be treated with sensitive
recognition
.
Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.214
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CHAPTER III
THE NECESSITY OF A NEW SECURITY CONCEPT
To foster and stabilize the process of democratization
it is necessary to establish a stable security agenda. For
states as well as for individuals, enjoying security entails
an effort to limit or even diminish threats. Threats to the
democratic society can occur on two different levels -
internal and external. It is the supreme task for the new
democracies to establish capacities to counterbalance them.
On the internal level, economic performance represents a
paramount aspect. An unsatisfying material standard can
generate into social unrest. Also, it is vital for the
democracies to incorporate various social groups into the
state or at least into their allegiance. As seen in chapter
II, the military can impose a severe threat on the system.
In addition, without the integration of minorities a
security agenda is incomplete, and therefore gives way to
political violence, ethnonationalism and probable separatist
movements. Furthermore, Eastern Europe has to establish a
security concept that manages external threats which run
from border conflicts to the extreme of war.
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1. Internal Threats
A. Eastern Europe
The current situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary imposes a variety of internal threats to the newly
established democracies. First, ethnonat ionalism : the
general problem with ethnic minorities is their perspective
of oppression with the denial of civil rights or economic
opportunities in comparison to standards offered by the
country of their ethnic origin. Such claims could result in
demands for better political representation and economic
equality but can also activate notions of nationalism in the
home countries
.
The result of the parliamentary election in
Czechoslovakia in June 1992 transferred the "Movement for
Democratic Slovakia", headed by Vladimir Meciar into the
strongest political power in Slovakia. Meciar favors a loose
confederation of two sovereign nations. 108 In the Federal
Republic, Czechs represent two-thirds of the national
population. The ethnic division of the country is further
augmented in economic terms, for Slovaks live in the
economically lesser developed part of the country. 109
Negotiations between the two sides accounted for the
prospect of a limited federal government with the five
108 New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3
109 Daniel N. Nelson, 1991, p.139
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ministries of defense, finance, interior, economics and
foreign affairs. 110
As in the case of Yugoslavia, Communism covered up
ethnic and cultural differences. In Czechoslovakia however,
both sides seem to agree to the process of the federation's
split without the use of any violence. The union was
artificial, backed up by a tight authoritarian regime. An
eventual separation might even reduce ethnic tensions, given
the historical fact that Slovaks and Czechs were never
involved in any mutual armed conflicts.
In Hungary, gypsies and Rumanians represent minority
groups, while Magyars are more than 90 per cent of the
population. 11 ' In Poland, a German minority, centered in
Silesia and part of Germany before World War II, has kept
strong cultural traditions throughout the communist period.
With the unification, the minority stressed their desire to
join Germany. 112 These cultural and ethnic tensions in
Poland 113 were suppressed by communist rule. They are now
reaching the surface of the political process in the new
democratic and pluralist society.
110 New York Times, June 21, 1992, p.3
111 David Nelson, 1991, p.140
112 David Nelson, 1991, p.140
113 for a discussion on the border tensions between Germany and
Poland see Chapter III. A.
2
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Second, there is a rejection of Capitalism and a
feeling of disappointment among those societal groups which
find it hard to adapt to the new political and economic
system. Communism provided a tight and safe social net
for its citizens. The individual's life was organized,
planned, and taken care of. The social welfare system
provided a stable though not prosperous living standard for
nearly all of the population. With the introduction of
Capitalism, privatization, and the gradual decrease of the
state's economic activity people had to organize their life
for themselves. Competition for jobs, unemployment, drops in
living standards -in general the adjustment to the lifestyle
of liberal Capitalism- created political unrest and tension.
As Vaclav Havel noted:
They (the people) did in fact hate the
totalitarian regime, but at the same time,
they spent their whole life in it, and
in spite of their will, got accustomed to
it. They became used to the fact that there
is an omnipotent state over them that can
do everything, take care of everything and
is responsible for everything. One cannot
just lose this habit overnight". 115
The fear of taking risks, the stress of living without
social certainties was completely new to populations which
had not known unemployment for over forty years. Indications
114 see: New York Times: East Bloc Treads Water in an Ocean of
Lethargy, April 08, 1992, p.Al
115 in: New York Times, April 08, 1992, p.A12
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of this negative attitude towards Capitalism fostered by a
depressing economic environment can be seen everywhere
throughout Eastern Europe. The suicide rate in Poland
increased by ten per cent in 1991, while it reached a
record-high in Hungary. iiD The Presidential election in
Poland in November 1990 turned out to be a rejection of the
economic policies of former Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki who only finished third in the race.
Third, there is an apathy towards the democratic
political process mixed with an anger against the current
ruling political elites. The malaise of the economic
situation which has an impact on almost every individual's
life created a "suspicion of governmental authority". 117
Some people blame the political elites, who are viewed as
incapable of solving the social and economic problems. A
mixture of. frustration and disillusionment concludes in an
apathy towards the political process.
Indications can already be seen throughout Eastern
Europe. In the two Presidential elections in Poland in 1990
only sixty per cent and less than fifty per cent of the
electorate voted. In local elections in Hungary and Poland
turnouts were only one-third to two-thirds. 118 In a small
116 New York Times, April 8, 1992, p.A12
117 David Nelson, 1991, p.141
118 David Nelson, 1991, p.141
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town in Poland with 595 voters, only one person cast his
ballot
. Although low proportions are not uncommon in
long-established democratic societies, in a young democracy
after decades of authoritarian rule this indicates already a
disinterest for political participation and the political
process in general.
Such apathy and distrust towards the ruling governments
give space for new political movements and ideas, which need
not necessarily follow democratic patterns. The candidacy of
Stanislaw Tyminski can be regarded as an example that showed
the vulnerability of the political public to vote for
candidates who do not present a program but a mere
antithesis to the political establishment mixed with
populistic notions. The Polish emigrant Tyminski, a self-
claimed, self made-millionaire, who flew in from Canada
without a political organization and with hardly any
campaigning finished second in the Presidential elections
behind Lech Walesa.
Fourth, the old nomenclature: the former communist
party-apparatus infiltrated all sectors of society.
Recently, some post-communist leaders of Eastern Europe have
been accused of prior cooperation with the Communist secret
119 New York Times, April 8, 1992, p.A12
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police. 120 Although Eastern Europe expelled top officials
of the communist parties from political positions, the web
between party and state-bureaucracy was so close-meshed,
that numerous party members and secret-police informers who
kept the system working remained in government jobs. This
former entanglement of party and state can delay or even
damage the democratization process. Old attitudes, values
and modes of behavior linger on and slacken the
transformation from an authoritarian bureaucracy into an
institution responsible to the democratic state.
Fifth, the economic performances of the particular
countries play a crucial role (see also Table 1.). Economic
growth is the financial base for the development of a
society. The recent revolutions in Eastern Europe including
East Germany proved that people also supported democracy for
an eventual improvement of their own particular economic
situation. This "promise" made by capitalism has to be
fulfilled by the different countries in order to avoid
120 In Poland, former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski issued a
list of members of the parliament who cooperated with the
former secret police. The incident caused an uproar
resulting in the ousting of Olzewski's government.
in: New York Times, 21 June, 1992
In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak parliament released a report
linking the republic's most popular politician, Vladimir
Meciar, to the secret police. Meciar denied the charges
and gained a solid majority in Slovakia in the
parliamentary elections of June 1992.
in: New York Times Magazine, 31 May 1992
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Table 1
. Economic Data on Eastern Europe
Unemployment Czechoslovakia: 6.5 per cent
Hungary
: 8.3 per cent
Poland: 12.2 per cent
(December 1991)
(December 1991)
(March 1992)
Inflation Czechoslovakia: 2 per cent
Hungary: 35 per cent
Poland: 1266 per cent
(June 1991)
( 1991)
(February 1990)
Extern al debt Czechoslovakia: US$
Hungary: US$
Poland: US$
- 8,100 million
-20, million
-39,282 million
(1990)
(1990)
(1990)
GNP pe r head Czechoslovakia: US$ 3,450
Hungary: US$ 2,560
Poland: US$ 1,700
(1989)
(1989)
(1990)
source: Europa Yearbook, 1992, Vol
. I
Vol .II,
p.887, 1329
p . 2250
disappointment and frustration which eventually lead to a
disapproval of the democratic and capitalist system and to
political unrest. The example of Argentina in the 1970 's
showed that a failure in improving the general standard of
living endangers democracy and make people receptive to
anti-democratic change.
With the transformation from a state economy to a
market capitalism four major problems emerged, all similar
in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. First, trade shocks:
soon after the upheavals in Eastern Europe in the summer of
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1989 trade with the Soviet Union began to decrease. 121 The
USSR reduced its deliveries of oil and natural gas in order
to export them for hard currency to the West
. As a
consequence, the artificial pricing system within the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) came under
severe pressure, and eventually led to the dissolution of
COMECON in June 1991. Suddenly, Eastern Europe had to pay
more for energy supplies and raw materials.
Furthermore the growing chaos in the Soviet economy
further disrupted trade relations with Eastern Europe 122
.
The USSR fell behind in its payments to East European
suppliers, while the newly emerged republics declined to
cover the debts. East European firms responded by
withholding further supplies unless a bank guarantee was
offered, thus reducing the amount of trade even further.
With German unification, trade relations of Eastern
Europe with the GDR came to an end. East Germany represented
a market for agricultural and industrial goods and provided
scarce industrial components and high-technology
products. 123 Also, western companies gained access to
markets formerly dominated by communist state-economies,
while the products of Eastern European enterprises have not
been able to compete with western products. In addition,
121 Mark Kramer, 1992, p.136
122 Mark Kramer, 1992, p.137
123 Mark Kramer, 1992, p.138
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trade among all Eastern European countries dropped
significantly after the transformation to hard currency
accounting within the COMECON system.
Second, privatization of former state owned enterprises
has been hobbled by legal complications. Although Hungary,
Poland and Czechoslovakia have implemented privatization
programs, the legal situation of numerous cases is still
unsolved. The issue circulates around two problems: the
controversy of either restitution or compensation of
formerly expropriated citizens and the pace of the reforms.
Private property is a basic element of capitalism. It is a
paramount necessity for the three nations to clarify the
process of transformation from state into private ownership.
Until then, due to this unstable situation entrepreneurs and
companies will remain hesitant about investing in the
market, for they might later have to face restitution
claims. 124
Third, the implementation of a market economy in
Eastern Europe involves a set of reforms. Price
liberalization, currency convertability
,
trade and banking
reforms, privatization, labor deregulation and a macro
economic stability are the goals set fourth by Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The actual timing of all these
124 see: Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.26-27
Mark Kramer, 1991, p.139-144
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In the case ofmeasures represents a difficult task. 125
Poland, the country followed the concept of a "shock
therapy
,
a radical shift towards Capitalism within a short
period of time. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have taken
gradualist approaches. Neither economists nor past
experiences offer clear advice about how to proceed. The
transformation of a centrally planned economy into a free
market system represents an unparalleled experience,
previously unknown in history.
Fourth, economic and political culture: forty years of
Communism had a severe impact on the mentality of the
people. The regime organized the individual's life. Jobs,
social security, even leisure was to a large extent provided
and controlled by the state apparatus. Life followed a
beaten and streamlined track, apathy dominated. A capitalist
society however demands personal engagement and creativity.
Everyone is to a certain extent responsible to organize his
or her life. It will take an unpredictable amount of time to
change the people's mentality. The success of Capitalism
depends on innovative individuals. Innovation however, was
neglected for forty years.
The people in Eastern Europe got used to a certain
personal materialistic security: a guaranteed job and a
tight social net. This level of security is not provided by
see: Michael Roskin, 1991, p.180-185
Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.27-28
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capitalism. It seems only logical that people have problems
adjusting to this abrupt cognitive change. A life-time
guarantee turned into the need for personal effort.
Therefore all of the three Eastern European countries
are confronted with heavy worker resistance. When
implementing measures which were initially designed to bring
the economy on the path of free market, interest collisions
were often unavoidable. Austerity measures, the liberation
of prices or the privatization of former state-owned
enterprises including massive lay-offs affected and
threatened the individuals' materialistic security. Thus,
worker unrest has limited the government's range of reform
choices and policies. 126
In Czechoslovakia in early 1991, labor unrest forced
the federal administration to surrender its plan to
quadruple the prices of electricity, gasoline and heating.
Also, due to worker pressure in Slovak factories
Czechoslovakia continues to produce military equipment,
designed for the export to Third-World countries. Public
pressure in Slovakia remained so strong that the federal
government had to delay its plan and ideological commitment
to gradually refrain from military exports.
Furthermore, resistance prevented agricultural
decollectivization. In Poland, the Presidential election in
late 1990 showed the dissatisfaction of the population with
see: Mark Kramer, 1992, p.145-146
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the austerity measures of Tadeusz Masowiecki
. It provided
for a decisive victory for the populist Lech Walesa, in
Hungary, the government abandoned its plan to cut
agricultural subsidies after nationwide protests. Labor
unrest created pressure on the government to loosen some
austerity measures
.
Sixth, the inherited economic system of Communism
represents a brake block for the development of a capitalist
system. Communism left an economic disaster behind. 127
Prices of goods were unrelated to costs and heavily
subsidized. The inherited foreign debts taken over from the
former regimes are striking (see table III.l). Industrial
production, technology, agriculture and infrastructure had
severe deficits compared to western standards and now has to
be either reorganized or entirely substituted in order to
gain a competitive position in the world market.
In Poland and Czechoslovakia, a "Mittelstand"
,
128
which represents the backbone of every market economy was
simply missing. A slight relief exists in Hungary, for the
country introduced modest market reforms in the early 1980 's
that gave permission for private economic activity for some
small businesses to compete with products, manufactured by
state-owned enterprises.
127
see: Janusz Ordover, 1991, p.25
128 The German term refers to entrepreneurs with small or mid-
size businesses.
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A financial infrastructure, such as stock and bond
markets and private commercial or investment banks was
absent in communist economies. Finally, the management of
state businesses simply lacked capitalist financial and
management skills, disregarding consumers' needs or cost
minimization. Economic activity was based on plan
assessments. Fixed production quotas over a time span of
five years had to be fulfilled, thus neglecting market or
social influences or changing demands or market situations.
The capitalist management skill to respond to reality was
left undone, substituted by bureaucracy. To overcome this
deficit, the post-communist governments tried to attract
western expertise to work in Eastern Europe. But apart from
metropolitan areas such as Prague or Budapest, foreign
managers were confronted with housing which does not match
western standards, a lack of cultural entertainment or a
pre-war telephone network; in short an environment which
demands a certain amount of idealism.
2. External Threats
A variety of external threats represent a challenge to
the security and endanger the process of the establishment
of a stable democracy. First, Poland and Germany signed a
bilateral treaty in 1990, in which Germany recognized the
western border of Poland. In 1991, a formal commitment to
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friendship and cooperation has been reached. 129 But the
region of Silesia remains a political issue. Among some
Germans, the Polish part of Silesia is still seen as a legal
part of the German nation with a German tradition and
heritage. From a legal point of view the issue seemed to be
settled. However, the strong ties of the German part of
Silesia to its Polish counterpart still represent a source
for possible tensions. In addition, tensions along the
remaining borderline recently escalated into violent attacks
against Polish visitors to eastern Germany. Right-extremists
as well as average eastern German citizens blamed Poles for
buying out their shops, while conflicts were further
sharpened by ethnic tensions. Such incidents indicate that
old issues and resentments are now emerging again. For forty
years Communism imposed a forced friendship upon the two
states of East Germany and Poland, a brotherhood along the
"Peace Border". It was a fake, far from reality.
Second, the unpredictable situation in the republics of
the former Soviet Union. Although an intentional aggression
is hardly to be feared, Eastern Europe nevertheless has to
raise concern about the political development in this
region. According to Gerhard Wettig, "the momentum of
belligerent action could lead to a spillover effect". 130 An
129 New York Times, 03 April, 1992
130 Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.233
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armed conflict on former Soviet territory would involve
further security risks, such as the use of ABC weapons,
unsafe or irresponsible stored dangerous material, or
’
nuclear weapons and their difficult protection against
illegal appropriation. Additional threats are drug
trafficking from Asia, organized crime and possible large-
scale migrations due to mass poverty or war. 131
In this context, the security of Poland is particularly
endangered. According to a Soviet census in 1989
, 1.12
million ethnic Poles 333 are living in parts of Belorussia,
Ukraine and Lithuania, which belonged to Poland in the
period preceding World War II. The potential of a rising
Polish nationalism could increase the tension along the
various borderlines.
Furthermore, the new republics Belorussia, Ukraine and
Lithuania are themselves democracies in transition. Their
democratization process is unstable as well. The political
direction which these countries pursue seems to be
democratic. However, the victory of the former Communist
Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania indicates that the
possibility of political unrest, turmoil and regime change
should not be neglected. Also, Ukraine imposes an acute
131
132
see: Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.233-234
Daniel N. Nelson, 1991, p.142
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problem
.
it still
Even if the country gives up its nuclear weapons
possesses a powerful army of some 400, 000 men. 133
Third, Hungary and the Hungarian minorities in its
bordering countries. With the treaty of Trianon in 1920,
Hungary was forced to give up one-third of its pre-war
territory to Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and
Austria. Today, more than four million Hungarians live in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. 134 Due to these
large minority groups in Eastern European nations, voices of
Hungarian nationalism and even unification based on a common
historical and cultural identity, as well as border tensions
are likely in this region.
The most severe tension is represented in the case of
Romania. Figures estimate that between 1.5 and 2.3 million
Hungarians are living in the Rumanian territory of
Transylvania
. The Hungarian minority claims that they
have been denied economic and political rights. Furthermore,
the political process towards democracy is making progress
in Hungary, while it lags severely behind in Romania, which
is more or less a new communist dictatorship in pseudo-
democratic disguise.
133 Otto Pick, 1992, p.28
134 New York Times, April 08, 1992, p.A12
135 David Nelson, 1991, p.143
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Also, the 600,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia are
confronted with the uncertainty of the future of the Czech-
Slovak Federal Republic. In an independent Slovak state,
consisting of only 4.5 million people, the chances are
likely that they will press for greater autonomy.
Fourth, the unstable situation in former Yugoslavia.
With ethnic groups struggling for independence, the
artificial construct of Yugoslavia imposes a further threat
to the security of Eastern Europe. Serbian aggressiveness
already has culminated into a spill over effect to foreign
territory. Border violations resulted in the bombardment of
the Hungarian border town Bares in October 1991. 136 The
civil war in former Yugoslavia caused a tide of refugees.
The estimated figure in Bosnia alone amounts to 1.3 million,
from which at least 700,000 have fled the country. Croatia
as well as West European governments have resolved not to
admit any more. 137 The uncertainty of the outcome of this
conflict imposes a security threat to all Eastern European
states. Control mechanisms to manage the civil war are so
far not existent.
As these examples show, the entire region of Eastern
Europe is confronted with numerous security threats, but is
see: Osteuropa, May 1992, p.A281
see: New York Times, October 28, 1992, p.A8137
lacking a reliable security structure. In fact, in the
aftermath of the Cold War and with the destruction of the
Warsaw Pact, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are facing a
security vacuum. "Europe's unstable East" 138 needs to
implement a new security concept that is capable of
counterbalancing a variety of internal and external threats,
m order to prevent antidemocratic forces from challenging
the new regimes
.
B. The Transition of Spain
1. Internal and External Threats
Spain was confronted with several internal threats.
First, the role of the armed forces: as seen in II. C. the
military represented a severe threat to the new democracy.
The incorporation into the new system failed, for the Army
was not offered a new ideological base - the role of a
defender of democracy instead of the former positions as a
security force for internal repression.
Second, political violence and terrorism, especially in
the Basque country, challenged the new regime. This issue is
closely related to regionalism and demands for regional
autonomy in Spain. Comparable to the current situation in
138 David Nelson, 1991, p.137
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Eastern Europe, regional and cultural dive
suppressed over the years of authoritarian
these demands abruptly emerged.
rsif ication was
rule. After 1977
I
Third, the democratic governments of the UCD and the
PSOE were confronted with unfavorable economic conditions.
The task of adapting the industrial complex to competitive
international standards happened during a worldwide economic
downswing 1 39 including two major oil crises and resulted in
high unemployment rates, which are still the highest among
all OECD countries. In 1978, 8 per cent were out of job,
while this figure increased to 22 per cent in 1986. 140
The economic transformation of Spain into a market
economy initially suffered from various problems, inherited
by the Franco regime. 141 The technological standard was
poor with low capital investment. 142 The economic
modernization of the 1960 's and the unprecedented growth
139 Edward Malefakis, 1986, p.229
140 in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.I, 1980, p.1080
Vol.II, 1986, p . 2369
141 GNP and Education in 1971 compared with other countries.
France Greece Spain
GNP per head (in US$) : 3.180 1 . 120 1.070
% by sector : agriculture 6.0 19.5 13.5
industry 48 .
4
30.5 34 .
4
expenditure on education 4.5 2 2.2
(% of GNP)
Source: OECD Economic Survey, 1973, p.65
142 Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.5
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rates were based on the development of basic industries,
such as shipbuilding and steel production and did not relate
to the fundamental structural problems of the Spanish
economy. Spain had traditionally been an agricultural
country. Modernization however did not cover this sector.
The problems increased with the rise in oil prices
after 1973 when suddenly shipbuilding and steel were
confronted with higher production costs. 143 Due to Franco's
reliance on a system of autarky, international trade
relations had been neglected for decades. 144 Furthermore,
after Franco's demise in 1975, labor costs increased and the
economy largely depended on foreign investment, capital and
technology. The initial economic problems put the new regime
under a harsh test. The government was forced to put large
sums of money aside to finance unemployment. Also, Madrid
was confronted with severe inflation due to excessive wage
levels and expenditures of the public sector. Also, the
annual growth of the GDP, which averaged an impressive seven
per cent between 1960 and 1973 dropped significantly (see
also Table 2
.
)
.
143 Benny Pollack, 1987, p.141
144 In 1973 imports totaled 561.543 million pesetas, compared
to 4.177.034 million pesetas in 1983. The corresponding
figures for exports are 302.670 and 2.846.749 million
pesetas which represent an increase of 370 per cent
(imports) and 470 per cent (export) over a period of 10
years. in: Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.1117
Vol.II, 1986, p . 2369
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Table 2. Economic Pat. a on Spain
in per cent:
Inflation
1977 : 28, 0
1978 : 16, 5
1979 : 15, 0
1983 : 12, 2
1985 : 8, 1
sources
:
Europa Yearbook,
GDP Growth rates
1979 : 0, 8
1980 : 1,7
1981 : 0,4
1982 : 1,2
Vol .1,
Vol .1,
1978,
1981,
p. 1108
p.1089
Vol .1,
Vol .11,
1983,
1985,
p.1070
p. 802
Unemployment
1978 : 8, 0
1981
:
11, 6
1983: 17, 0
1984 : 20, 0
1986: 22, 0
Vol
.1, 1980, p . 1080
Vol .1, 1982, p.1076
Vol.I, 1984, p. 775
Vol .11, 1986, p.2369
The socialist government of the PSOE responded to these
problems in an unexpected way, almost using conservative
measures. The PSOE made little attempt to create new jobs.
According to Edward Moxon-Browne, unemployment is widely
accepted in Spain among all Spanish parties, but it is
acknowledged that nothing can directly be done about
it.— Instead, the Gonzales administration devaluated the
Peso in its first year in power by 8 per cent ,—'
'
cut
145 / Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.10
146 / Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.2369
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public expenditures and froze wages and gave priority to
fighting inflation— in order to establish an economic
climate which would stimulate private investment and
therefore create jobs. The PSOE intended to promote more
technologically advanced industries, hoping to transform the
economic structure of the country from a labor-intensive
system into a capital-intensive system .!!§/
Several conditions favored the success of the Spanish
transition. The support for democracy was already strong
some years prior to Franco's demise. This positive attitude
among the population provided for a "reservoir of good
will"—7 when the government was under economic pressure.
Also, the international and regional environment favored the
combination of a democratic regime and a capitalist economy,
so that the process of integration into the international
market could succeed.
Furthermore, tourism served as a booming sector within
the economy .—7 The number of tourists outnumbered the
entire Spanish population as early as in 1972. This had a
strong impact on Spanish life. Secularism and consumerism
developed, a proper infrastructure was created, and the
147 / see: Edward Moxon-Browne
,
1989, p.8-10
148 / in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.143
149 / Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.14
150 / Edward Malefakis, 1986, p.218
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tourist industry benefitted mainly small scale enterprises
and helped create a "Mittelstand"
.
Most significantly, Spain early sought for an
integration into the European community. On July 28, 1977,
the UCD
-government applied for full membership of the EC.
The other parties in the Spanish parliament fully supported
the government's decision. According to Benny Pollack,
there was total agreement that no economically
viable or politically suitable alternative tothe European Community existed. It was accepted
that.
. .accession would be considered by the
Spanish people as a display of international
political support for the new democratic regime". 1^-'
incorporation into the Community was judged as a
fostering factor to uplift the economy and as a security
force for the success of reforming the political system into
a democracy.
In terms of external threats Spain did not have to face
a major problem. Although the country made its transition to
democracy while the antagonism of the Cold War was still
valid, the Spanish KP gradually lost public support. The
threat of a possible communist infiltration connected with
the strategic importance of the Iberian peninsula in the
backyard of western Europe was at no times compelling.
151 / Benny Pollack, 1987, p.138
2. The New Spanish Security Policy
The main feature of the new Spanish security was the
membership in NATO. After Franco the Alliance showed
enthusiasm about a Spanish incorporation .Hi7 But the
skeptical Spanish public was opposed to join a military
alliance where the United States was the commanding force.
Spain showed little enthusiasm for American foreign policies
in La t in-America .—7 The U.S. had sustained the Franco
regime with economic and military aid through an agreement,
signed in 1953. In return, Franco gave the U.S. four
military bases, over which they had virtually sovereign
control. After Franco's death, these bases represented a
political issue of great controversy.—'' A strong
neutralist stand existed in Spain that argued against
Spanish involvement in Cold War alliances, while the
American presence actually endangers the Spanish security.
The military bases therefore did not only represent a
reminder of the former Franco-U.S. cooperation, but further
had the potential of drawing Spain into the pattern of the
East-West conflict.
152 / Benny Pollack, 1987, p.152
153 / Differences arose over El Salvador and Nicaragua. Prime
Minister Gonzalez as vice president of the Socialist
International and head of the Committee for the Defense
of the Nicaraguan Revolution favored direct
negotiations between the Salvadoran guerrillas and
government, and opposed efforts to destabilize the
Sandinista government.
154 / see: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.86
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The first Christian-Democratic government under Adolfo
Suarez advocated NATO but was still hesitant, fearing a
break of the general consensus on Spanish foreign policy.
With the coup in February 1982, the necessity to integrate
the military into society became evident. Suarez' successor,
the Christian-Democrat Calvo Soleto regarded NATO now as
"conducive to the democratization of the armed forces" .lit7
The Alliance should take the role of a vehicle to foster the
modernization of the military and in providing the armed
forces a new ideological base and a new place in society:
defending the Spanish territory against outside aggression,
as opposed to the former internal orientation.
In May 1982, Spain joined the Alliance, but a few
months later, the parliamentary elections brought the
Socialist government of Felipe Gonzales into power, who
promised a referendum on the issue. Gonzales opposed a
Spanish entry, regarding the strong public opposition
against an integration in NATO. He argued that the entry
into the Alliance would undermine the development of an
autonomous foreign policy, that the dependence on the United
States would increase. His fear was a vision of Spain drawn
into the pattern of the East-West conflict.
However, after several months in power, Gonzales
performed a U-turn on NATO. The government now put more
emphasis on the strategic importance and the territorial
155 / Benny Pollack, 1987, p.156
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security. Gonzales now stated that the bilateral agreement
wrth the United States would not provide as much security as
the Alliance. Furthermore, he approved Soleto's position,
who stressed the modernizing factor of NATO. The problem for
Gonzales was to convince his party and the public of his
conversion. The delay of the referendum which was held in
1986 indicated his difficulties in doing so.13^ Within
these four years, the PSOE had to perform a balancing act.
On one side, strong public resentments against NATO had to
be eased. On the other side, Gonzales still had to support
an integration into the Alliance, in order to show
enthusiasm for European cooperation in the realm of the
complicated accession negotiations for the EC.
While there was no formal connection between a Spanish
membership in NATO and an accession into the EC, the two
organizations are psychologically intertwined. As the former
German Minister of State Alois Mertes stated in 1982,
We cannot pretend a Spain which contributes
. . .
to the defense of the West should be deprived of
its economic benefits".—7
While NATO provides for the security of the continent, the
EC provides economic benefits. Thus, if Spain would become a
part of the security mechanism and therefore contribute to
the defense of Europe, it would be hard for the EC to
156 / see: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.87
157 / in: Eusebio Mujal-Leon, 1983, p.117
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justify a refusal to give the country its economic
benefits .112/
The compromise offered by Gonzalez was a restricted
NATO- membership based on the French model, that is to say
with no integration into military planning and with no
nuclear weapons on Spanish territory.^ NATO membership
was finally approved by 52 per cent of the electorate in
February 1986.
The second keystone of the Spanish security was
represented in a number of institutional arrangements to
satisfy the claims for autonomy by the several regions. A
section in the Constitution was devoted to the regions'
autonomy. In Catalonia and in the Basque country separate
regional governments existed as early as 1980, with their
own regional institutions, giving respect to the regions'
different languages and national identities. Furthermore,
the central government fosters an economic autonomy. The
Basque government has the right to levy taxes. While the tax
rates are identical with the rest of Spain, only one-third
15_8/ In this context one might argue that the case of France
shows that a membership in NATO is not an essential
requirement for an accession to the EC. But although
France is not a member in NATO, it nevertheless
contributes significantly to the European security
through its military bases in the south-western part of
Germany
.
159 / in: Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.87
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of the taxes from the Basque country goes to Madrid. By
1983, the Madrid government had been granted a status
autonomy to seventeen regions, each with their own
parliament, supreme court and civil service.
of
Third, in fighting terrorism, the Spanish government
took a variety of actions. In terms of anti-terrorist
legislation a state of siege could be declared by the
parliament in the event of an insurrection or act of force
against the sovereignty or independence of Spain, its
territorial integrity or its institutional order.
Constitutional rights could be temporarily suspended .Hi7
In addition, Spain tried to make the security forces more
effective in their fight against political violence.
Furthermore, through cooperation with France the government
hoped to eliminate the French territory as a base and refuge
for ETA operations.—7
Fourth, the integration into the European Community
accounted for an economic development which stabilized the
formerly fragile economy .— The Community realized that
economic issues could not be separated from security
160 / Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.56
161 / Edward Moxon-Browne, 1989, p.58
162 / see also chapter IV. A.
2
163 / see also chapter IV. A.
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aspects, m Dublin in September 1984
, the ten Heads of
~ »•' “•—- .........
... ... „
economic affair. -n The community, although basically an
economic organization, has a strong impact on a nation «s
security. Apart from a prospering economy which secures a
democratic transition the organization provides an arena for
political cooperation and consultation among its members.
Also, being incorporated into a community of democratic
countries accounts for an additional feature of a security
frame. In the era preceding World War II no democratic
country in Europe had challenged the land border of its
democratic neighbor.
——
Zhs Trans ition of Portugal
l-i—Intern al and External Threats
Besides the significant threat that the military
imposed on the process of democrat izat ion ,
^
Portugal was
confronted with an active and initially popular Communist
party. The Portuguese Communist Party (CPP) was the "most
hard-line, pro Soviet in Western Europe".—/ its leader,
Alvaro Cunhal spent several years in exile in
!£!/ in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.139
165 / see chapter II.
D
166 / Robert Harvey, 1978, p.38
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Czechoslovakia. He opposed the de-Stalinisat ion processes
and identified with hardliners in the Kremlin. Tactical
considerations on how to gain power determined his political
behavior
.
During the first months after the coup, the Soviet
Union was impressed by Cunhal and his chances of gaining
power and support among the public. This positive evaluation
of a likely chance that communists could control the
political scene was fostered by the composition of the
various provisional governments. From September 1974 until
November 1975 radical AFM officers and the Prime Minister
Colonel Vasco Gonzales were affiliated with the communist
party and largely directed the politics from the third to
the fifth provisional government.—7 Thus, the Soviet
Union gave the CPP unqualified support while seeking their
chances of establishing a communist -inf luenced government in
the backyard of NATO. Ten million dollars per month were
transferred from Moscow to the headquarters of the CPP.Ci^-7
The significance however of the communist party
gradually decreased. Within the military, General Eanes and
the forces committed to a democratic regime gained more and
167 / for further information on composition of the
provisional governments and the political struggle for
power in the aftermath of the coup see:
Walter C.Opello, 1985, p.65-80
168 / in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.41
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more control over the situation, culminating in the removal
of Gonzales and other radical officers from positions of
power in the fall of 1975. With Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger regarding Portugal as a crucial sphere of
interest, the Soviet Union heavily reduced its support
.
1697
Although access to government al positions had been
denied after 1976, public support for the Communist party
and other left wing organizations remains considerable 112/
and the political left established itself as a political
force in a Marxist tradition that regards the transformation
of Portugal into a communist society as its utmost goal. But
so far, the communist movement does not represent a cogent
threat to the democratic system.
A third internal threat to the democratic transition is
caused by an apathy in the Portuguese society towards the
political process. The participation of significant parts of
the population in the decision making process is lacking.
The parties in Portugal remain "bureaucratic, hierarchical
169 / For a further discussion on the US-Soviet relation over
Portugal see chapter IV. B.
2
170 / In the general elections of 1977 the CPP cast 14,35%
of the votes. In later elections, the CPP formed a
coalition together with other left-wing parties. The
percentages: 1980: 19%, 1987: 12,14%, 1991:8,8%
in: Europa Yearbook,
1977, Vol.I, p.1048, 1980, Vol.I, p.1045
1988, Vol.II, p.2217, 1992, Vol.II, p.2280
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and Lisbon oriented" .HI'
. The electoral law enacted in
December 1974 divided the country into 24 local districts.
The party-lists for each district are set up by the
headquarters in the capital. Thus, the relationship between
the voters and the candidate are abstract, for the elector
chooses a party list and not an individual .Hi'
Also, the phenomenon of "personalismo" contributed to
the attitude of apathy towards the political process.
"Personalismo" can be defined as "the predominance of
individual or personal interests and actions over collective
or national interests and actions". ill7 The pursuing of
self-centered interests, particularly on the bureaucratic
level and among political parties over general interests is
common in the Portuguese society and deeply based in
cultural tradition .Hi7
As a result of "personalismo", a system of patronage
overshadowed the formation of the first democratic
governments. Although Portugal did not reach "Italian
standards
,
of corruption and personal linkages, the various
parties in government tried to create power bases by
appointing government supporters to bureaucratic posts.—7
171 / Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.206
172 / see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.206
173 / Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.342
174 / see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, pp.342
175 / see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.209
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In short, internal democracy and free expression was still
lacking in the Portuguese party system and keep popular
involvement on a low scale.
A further consequence of "personalismo" is the loyalty
to persons or personalities rather than to institutions or
ideas This kind of uncritical devotion to one
particular person has strong cultural roots. " Sebast ianism"
which can be described as "an atavistic, messianic form of
popular nationalism"—7
,
traces back to the 16th century,
when King Sebastian miraculously disappeared during an
expedition. This belief, that a hero, a great man will
appear to solve the national crisis is a widespread feeling
among the population. The tendency to create personal cults
has an impact on the contemporary Portuguese society. Annual
masses for national heroes, such as King Carlos I (died in
1908) and President Sidonio Pais (assassinated in 1914) are
still being held.
Although such myths are not uncommon in most countries,
in Portugal they result in a growing "Salazar"- cult,
referring to the country's dictator from 1932 to 1968
combined with a glorification of the achievements of his
dictatorship .—7 The impact of history, of kings, rulers
176 / see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.342
Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.209
177 / Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.343
178 / see: Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.364
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or even dictators who brought a certain fame to the nation
should not be neglected in the evaluation of the
contemporary attitude among the Portuguese population
towards their new system. It is this fame and glory which
serves as the gauge for the performance of politicians and
for the democracy in itself. As Douglas Wheeler noted,
(Portugal is) "a country where historical memories have an
ancient pedigree".—''
Despite high electoral turnouts between 78 and 92 per
cent in the general elections between 1975 and 1980, the
public remained skeptical towards the capability of
democracy to solve the country's problems. In the post-
revolutionary period, the new systom was held responsible
for a declining economy and for providing "a license for
communist skulduggery".—''
Here Portugal faces a complex problem, grounded in 50
years of authoritarian rule. The dictatorship left people
ill-equipped for democracy and political participation.
Apathy towards the political process and a focus on the
personal environment, on the family and the job were common
habits in the Salazar regime. Non-participation was further
fostered by the high rate of illiteracy (at least 25 per
cent—7 ) and a lack of education. The alteration of these
179 / Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.363
180 / Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.353
181 / Douglas Wheeler, 1983, p.352
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patterns of behavior, both on the individual level as well
as in the realm of internal party democracy is a long-term
process. The appreciation of democracy among the population,
the participation of broad parts of the society in the
political process so far still stands in opposition to
traditional modes of behavior and attitudes.
These factors, combined or separated can generate a
popular and broadly based rejection of democracy and can
serve as a hotbed for populist movements and a return to
authoritarian rule. The incorporation of the masses in the
political process and a more critical mentality towards
political elites need to be developed. Although almost
twenty years have been passed since the implementation of a
new political system, the preparation of the mass public for
democracy is as yet incomplete. Only if Portugal is able to
show that a democratic society has the capabilities to solve
social and economic tensions, a responsive attitude can
emerge where people realize that it "pays off" to
participate in and to contribute to the democratic process.
This will eventually transform into a gradual departure from
political apathy.
As a fourth internal threat, the economic performance
of Portugal hampered the democratic transition. As in the
case of Spain, Portugal faced an unfavorable international
economic climate in the initial period after the revolution.
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Due to a worldwide recession, the capabilities to attract
international investment and to reduce inflation were
limited. With a limited range of products, Portuguese
industry was not competitive abroad. Regarding the area of
farm products for instance, only wine and tomatoes undersold
European competitors.—7
In addition, having no natural resources, the country
has to import all of its fuel needs.—7 The impact of two
years of revolutionary struggle between civilians and the
army, between left and right and with provisional
governments in various political shades were heavy. When the
first freely elected government under Mario Soarez came into
power in 1976, Portugal's annual trade deficit amounted to
two billion dollars, the budget deficit was one billion
dollar and its foreign debt was over two billion
dollars.—7 From 1974 to 1976 Portugal had borrowed more
than three billion dollars and used up one billion dollars
of its foreign exchange reserves.—7
The industrial sector was a disaster. The nationalized
industries were largely divided into two groups: the big
monopolies and a number of small firms. The former were
182 / Economist, May 28, 1977, Survey p.20
183 / see: Tom Gallagher, 1985, p.217
184 / see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.119
185 / Economist, May 28, 1977, survey, p.22
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basically concentrated in the shipbuilding and cement
manufacture, two fields which provided for the economic boom
in the I960 's. But with the worldwide recession these
branches could not contribute to large foreign currency
earnings which are vital for an economic recovery.— The
smaller companies also did not make much profit, either
because of bad management during the two years of
revolution, while they were managed by worker cooperatives
or because they have been rescued by the state from
bankruptcy .If!7
As a result, the only chance for an investment revival
lay in the private sector, for it was basically concentrated
in areas where Portuguese products were still
internationally competitive, such as canned food and
textiles.—7 This was precisely the ambivalence that the
Portuguese economy had to face. An economic policy that
fostered the private sector and gave benefits to domestic
entrepreneurs and further attracted foreign investment
contradicted major concerns of the governing socialist
party, such as education or health care.
Thus, the revival of private investment and the
involvement of international financial sources was slow and
hesitating, due to the uncertainty over the Socialists
'
186 / see: Robert Harvey, 1979, p.120
187 / see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.212
188 / see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.121
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intention and policies. As a result of the revolution, the
state controlled the entire banking sector. It lacked
specialization and skill in credit management while the
efficiency was lowered by bureaucratic procedures^7 which
were typical for the Portuguese society. In addition, banks
suffered from a lack of confidence due to a labor action in
1975 that seized some banks while accounts were publicized
and examined.
Unemployment added to the various economic problems.
Under the dictatorship, there existed a high rate of under-
employment, but a low rate of wholly unemployed. Wages were
low, but most families occupied several jobs which provided
for a fair living. After the revolution underemployment
turned into heavy unemployment. Under the Salazar regime,
unemployment had simply been exported to a booming Europe.
Up to 1.5 million people went abroad and provided their
families regular financial support. With a worldwide
recession, most emigrants returned to Portugal, thus
increasing the unemployment problem and decreasing the
purchasing power due to a missing income. In addition, a
total of about one million refugees from Angola and
Mozambique had to be integrated into the economy.—7 Half
of them were under sixteen and were just about to enter or
had recently entered the labor market.
189 / Economist, May 28, 1977, survey p.23
190 / in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.126
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Table 3 . Economic Data on Portugal
unemployment inflation in per cent
1975: 10,0
1977: 16,0
1978: 12,5
1981: 7,6
1984: 10,8
1985: 11,0
June 1976: 12,0
June 1977: 36,0
August 1978: 22,0
June 1980: 16,6
June 1984: 29,3
June 1985: 19,3
Trade Balance: Current Balance: in million US$
1975 : -1
. 670 - 817
1977 : -2.506
-1.499
1981 : -5 .194 -2
. 850
1983: -3.084
-1
. 686
1985 : -1.504 386
GDP at constant 1977 prices
:
1977 5 .
6
1979 6 .
1
1981 1.3
1983 -0.3
1984 -1
.
1985 3.3
average 1977-86: 2.9
sources
:
Europa Yearbook, Vol.I, 1976, p . 1015
Vol.I, 1978, p . 1045
Vol.II, 1986, p.2164
OECD Economic Surveys, November 1976,
June 1984,
in million US$
Vol.I, 1977, p . 1029
Vol.I, 1979, p . 1032
p.22, July 1979, p.18
p . 36 1987/88, p.102
The conditions for an economic recovery were critical
for the new democratic system (see also Table 3.) . The
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Soarez Government walked a thin line between the
implementation of economic policies for recovery and social
unrest caused by the high rates of unemployment and
inflation as well as the soaring costs of living which more
than doubled between 1975 and 1977. 12I7 The Socialist
government introduced a variety of austerity measures to
reorganize the economy. In 1977, Portugal devaluated the
Escudo by 15 per cent and established price controls on
essential food items, import restrictions on luxury and non-
essential goods, as well as tax incentives for exporters and
incentives for private savings. Also, measures were taken to
reduce public spending.—7 In 1983, Soarez announced an
eighteen-month emergency program which included a reduction
of state subsidies and the opening of the banking and
insurance sectors for private investment.—7
The ability of the democratic government to ease social
tension and to offer prospects for an economic recovery
determined the fate of the democratic system for the army
was prepared to regain political control in case of a
further deterioration of the economic and social conditions.
Under the impact of such a severe economic malaise, it was
not surprising that Portugal sought admission into the EC as
191 / Robert Harvey, 1978, p.131
192 / Europa, Vol.I, 1978, p.1045
193 / Europa, Vol.II, 1986, p.2164
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early as March 1977. This step by Prime Minister Soarez had
the full support of all democratic parties.^7
As in the case of Spain, it was a generally accepted
assumption that modernization of the industries and the
desperately needed foreign investments could only be reached
through an incorporation within the Community. The prospect
of a membership within the EC was seen as vital for an
economic recovery and thus for the stabilization of
democracy
.
As with its Iberian neighbor, Portugal did not face any
severe external threats. Although excluded from the nuclear
planning group of NATO in the first years after the coup of
1974, neither Portugal nor the other member states
questioned the importance of its membership in the Alliance.
The heavy financial support of the Soviet Union to the
communist party did not further develop in any guerilla
activity, terrorism or revolutionary attacks to the
democratic regime. The incorporation into NATO with the
strategic importance of Portugal for the Alliance prevented
any outside intervention or aggression.
194 / see: Economist, May 28, 1977, survey p.29
98
2_ r The New Portuguese Security Policy
NATO represents the security-bedrock of the Portuguese
Democracy. While Spain under Franco was confronted with
political and economic isolation and unable to form ties
with the western world, Portugal joined the Alliance in 1949
at its creation. In the 1960 's the country turned its
economy towards Europe, by becoming a founding member of the
European Free Trade Association. Therefore, its linkages
with the West were already established at the outbreak of
the Revolution. Military cooperation within NATO represents
a traditional cornerstone of the security of post-war
Portugal, while the radical departure from colonialism in
the mid 1970 's further enhanced the western orientation of
Portuguese politics.
From a geo-political point of view the separate entity
of the Iberian region should suggest close cooperation with
Spain. However, each of the two countries has its own
separate identity and cooperation is almost absent in modern
history, a situation which Bernardo Futscher Pereira
described as "a long ingrained habit of turning their backs
to each other" .—7 However, with two authoritarian regimes
in power on the Iberian peninsula, the dictators Franco and
Salazar formed a loose alliance of moral and ideological
support. But with democracy on the rise, historical
195/ Bernardo Futscher Pereira, 1986, p.64
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resentments and defiance emerged again. It was not until the
common application to the EC that relations improved. Issues
of trade and fishery which deadlocked negotiations for a
further cooperation had to be clarified and settled in order
to reach an accession.—7 But the geopolitical position
and an almost parallel transition to democratic rule did not
further develop in a "special relationship" of cooperation.
The impetus of the EC in reducing the Spanish-
Portuguese antagonism indicates the impact, which the
Community has on Portuguese politics. The EC with its
prospect for economic recovery, political stability, and
security serves as the second cornerstone to the new
Portuguese security concept
.
The accession into the Community represented the third
and final step to complete the "European connection"
. In the
aftermath of the second World War, Portugal was a founding
member of NATO and consequently began a process of opening
towards Europe as well as towards North America. The
membership in the European Free Trade Association in 1967
further enhanced this development. The decision to join the
European Community represented the final departure from old
colonial politics. The country used to be caught between two
vises, that of Africa and that of Europe. The future however
196 / see: Bernardo Futscher Pereira, 1986, p.81-84
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was seen by all major parties exclusively in the realm of
western-European democracies .HZ/
197 / Robert Harvey, 1978, p.74
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS
A. The Case of Spain
-iL-i—Th® incorporation of the Military Apparatus
With the incorporation into the North Atlantic
Alliance, the internal threat of the military apparatus
ceased. In addition, Spain and France entered into a
comprehensive military agreement in November 1983, covering
joint areas production, training and the sharing of
facilities for ships, aircraft and transport. At the end of
the Hispano-French seminar in Leon in October 1988, the two
Foreign ministers agreed on a further coordination of
external action in Latin America, the Middle East and
Eastern Europe.—7 Furthermore, West Germany and Spain
established working groups on multilateral security
activities. All these actions helped integrating the Spanish
military into the international community and provided the
Armed Forces with a new task and ideological base.
The democratic transition changed the Spanish-American
relation. Neither country needed the other as much as in
1953 when the United States financially supported the Franco
regime in order to have the strategic advantage of military
bases on the peninsula. Relations were further clouded by a
198 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.105
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strong anti-Americanism among the population, expressed by
Jose Antonio Soler, host of the popular TV-show "Buenos
Dias"
:
'We had no American troops liberating us and
no Marshall Plan. All we saw was Eisenhower
embracing Franco"
In the aftermath of the coup in 1982, while European leaders
denounced the terrorist attack on the Spanish parliament,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig seemed to shrug off the
putsch with the remark that it was a Spanish internal
matter. Although Haig has not been briefed about the
incident when the press caught him, it further increased the
negative attitude towards the U.S. The rumor that the CIA
knew about the coup was taken for granted by many
Spaniards .—7
The distrust of the U.S. among the Spanish people
traces back to the Spanish-American war in 1898 which
essentially resulted in the loss of the Spanish status as a
significant European power. In a poll taken in May 1985, 64
per cent of the respondents said they do not regard the
United States as a true friend of Spain. 74 percent felt
that American arms policy is a danger to peace.—7 The
199 / in: U.S. News and World Report: 24 March 1986, p.30
200 / see: Ray Alan: "The U.S. and the Coup in Spain"
in: New Leader, April 20, 1981, p.ll
201/ in: Adrian Shubert, 1985, p.672
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core of the problem were the four American air bases. While
access to the bases played a major role in American
considerations
,
Spain remained skeptical towards a foreign
power on its territory. The base agreement was regarded as a
left over from the Franco regime
.
221/
Finally in 1988, the two nations agreed to deploy the
72 F-16 bombers by 1991. Spain was willing to pay 50 percent
of the costs of approximately one billion dollars, while it
also bought 73 F-18 bombers from the United States to
improve its defense and to account for the loss in the NATO
defense structure .^/ With the American forces leaving
Spanish ground, the emphasis in the post—Franco era was now
the security of U.S. investments and the preservation of
democratic institutions. The Spanish orientation shifted
from America to Europe.
Still, the United States played a helping role in
providing a proper Spanish security. Apart from the
enthusiasm towards Spanish membership in NATO, the U.S. gave
heavy financial assistance to reorganize the Spanish
202 / Economist: January 23, 1988, p.41
203 / Time, January 25, 1988, p.47
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military This process helped Spain achieve the
technological standards required by NATO.
2, Internal Threats
A closer cooperation with France was necessary in order
to gain control over Spain's major terrorist problem ETA.
For logistical reasons, France had been a traditional
operational base for ETA. The Basque provinces of Spain are
separated from France by the Pyrenees. ETA often used the
inaccessible territory to carry out terrorist attacks and
retreated across the border into France. ETA's struggle
against the Franco regime encouraged French tolerance but as
terrorism endangered the Spanish democratic system, Paris
began to collaborate with Madrid. The two countries reached
a bilateral accord in 1983 with increasing police and
judicial action. Although terrorism continues to
204 / The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency
for International Development)
:
in 1976 the U.S. provided no loans but $ 0.8 million in
grants: 0.6 for Military education and training
0.2 for Military Assistance Program
in 1977-8: $ 120 million loans, (credit financing)
$ 17 million grants:
$ 15 million Mil. Assistance Program
$ 2 million Mil educ . and training
in 1979: $ 120 million loans (credit financing)
$ 44.4 million grants:
$ 42.4 million Mil .Ass . Program
$ 2 million Mil educ. and training
205 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.106-108
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represent a threat to the Spanish security, the support of
France is essential in handling this issue.
The Spanish fight against political violence further
benefitted from the integration into Europe. Spain
participates in the Trevi Group, which consists of the
Interior and Justice Ministers and the police chiefs of the
twelve EC countries. The Group is designed to coordinate
cooperation among police and intelligence agencies
.
206 /
Foremost, admission into the European Community gave
Spain the opportunity of economic development, thus
stabilizing social peace and providing an arena for
political cooperation and consultation. A closer look at the
Spanish industrial output underlines the positive impact of
the EC for the Spanish economic recovery. The GNP per head
rose over 250 per cent from 3,520 US$ per head (in real
terms) in 1976 to 9,150 US$ in 1989.—7
Unemployment however continued to be a serious problem.
It has grown inexorably from eight per cent in 1978 to 22
per cent in 1986, while the figure of 1991 was 15 per cent.
Government policies could not cure this Spanish disease,
which arose due to the restructuring of the heavily
overstaffed industries of the Franco-era, in order to gain a
competitive position on the world market.
206 / see: Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, 1991, p.106
207 / Europa, Vol.II, 1991, p.2408
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In 1977 Spain applied for membership within the
European Community. With the restoration of democracy, the
country fulfilled a fundamental prerequisite and the
European Parliament gave support for an accession But
the negotiations which started in 1979 stretched out over a
period of six years. The difficulties here were based on
economic factors. This was particularly disappointing to
Spain. Especially in the early 1980 's, with a number of coup
attempts endangering the democracy, the country's hope for a
quicker incorporation which would have provided an extra
security was in vain.
The basic problem was the period of adaptation for the
Spanish economy. Spain favored a short amount of time for
its competitive agricultural products, while demanding a
longer period to adjust own protective tariffs for the weak
domestic industrial sectors. Other problems were fishing,
the free movement of labor and financial and budgetary
matters. Especially France -a competitor with Spanish
agricultural products- blocked the negotiations and
virtually deadlocked them between 1980 and 1981.—7
It was a political dimension that brought the
negotiations back on track. When the election of 1982 placed
the Spanish Socialist party PSOE in power, the country
quickly began to question its NATO membership which it
208 / see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.138
209 / see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.139
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joined under the Christian Democratic government of the UCD
m 1 9 8 1 .—
" This debate was a major political issue that
intensified after the PSOE declared its 180-degree-
turnaround-policy which was now in favor of the Alliance. In
September 1984 the ten Foreign Ministers of the European
Community met in Dublin for an extraordinary meeting. With
the 30th congress of the PSOE just three months ahead, the
Community was aware that further delays in the negotiations
might affect the current supporting attitude of the PSOE
towards NATO. Suddenly the Community added a political
dimension to the economic integration of Spain into Europe.
In Dublin, the Foreign Ministers agreed on the basis for the
accession—7 and nine months later in June 1985 the treaty
was signed.
By that time, Europe had gained outstanding economic
importance for Spain . 212/ From Franco's death in 1975 until
210 / see chapter III.B.2
211 / see: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.140
212/ Spanish Foreign Trade in % of Total
Imports Exports
1975 1985 1975 1985
USA 15 .
8
10 .
9
10.5 9.9
West-Germany 10.3 10 . 6 10.7 9.6
France 8.3 9.3 13.7 15.5
Great Britain 5.3 10 . 7 .
6
8.6
Italy 5.2 4 .
6
3.4 7.0
Netherlands 2.7 3.8 4 .
9
8.0
sources : Europa Yearbook, 1976, Vol .1, p.1101
1986, Vol .11, p . 2428
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the accession a decade later trade relations had steadily
increased. In 1983 half of the Spanish exports went to
Europe, a nominal increase of 670 per cent compared to
I 975 -— In addition, 64 per cent of imported capital
goods originated in the community, with France (25.7 per
cent of all Spanish imports) and West Germany (29.6 per
cent) providing for the major trading partners. Furthermore,
the EC and its member states replaced the United States in
terms of a source of foreign investment for Spain. In 1975
the U.S. accounted for 40.6 and the EC for 35.6 per cent,
while in 1983 the figures were 11.7 and 51 per cent.
In 1985 Spain was in fact already economically
incorporated in Europe. Only the institutional base of a
full membership was missing. The path that the country has
chosen was already irreversible: from an autarky to a modern
market economy embedded in the European Community. But
still, the long process of accession left the country open
to disturbances. The number of coups and a stumbling economy
endangered the stabilization of democracy.
In 1985, the EC supplied Spain with a pre-accession
grant of 550 Million ECU.—' Considering the variety of
economic problems and political turmoil this amount might
seem limited. But in nominal terms it represented a
213 / in: Benny Pollack, 1987, p.140
214 / in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.II, 1986, p.2369
109
significant portion of the EC budget and clearly indicated
the Community's commitment to help Spain reorganizing and
restructuring its economy. Still, the process of accession
dragged over a period of nine years until the European
vocation of the democratic-modernizers had been realized and
Spain, together with Portugal joined the Community on 1
January 1986.
During the era of General Franco the United States was
the main financial supporter of the regime. The mutual
agreement between the two states in this period can be
described as "money for strategy”. With the democratic
transition the relation was reduced to a united
determination against a communist threat.
After Franco's death the U.S. had a concern for the
security of U.S. investments. Also, in order to avoid a
strategic security gap, the establishment of stable
democratic institutions and the continuing access to its
military bases in Spain was in the American interest.—7
These concerns however, did not result in a significant
economic assistance. In the period before Franco's demise,
the United States granted Spain three million dollars
annually.—7 In the insecure and in retrospect
215 / Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy, 1984, p.152
216 / Figures according to "AID" (Agency for International
Development), Washington D.C.
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unpredictable year of 1976, financial support stopped. In
1977 however, grants of US$ ten million and from 1978 to
1980 US$ seven million annually of economic assistance were
given to Spain. Still, the figures indicate, that the United
States preferred to hand over the responsibility to Europe.
Europe more and more replaced the United States. The
increasing trade relations and the process of a political
and economic incorporation into the European Community had
no comparable American counterweight, resulting in the
stabilization of trade relations on a lower level.—7
The Spanish-American connection after World War II can
also be described as "a matter of security and expediency,
not an alliance" The character of this relation was
still valid after Franco's death. The United States'
strategic and security concerns were eased through an
extension of the 1976 base-agreement and eventually with the
integration of Spain into NATO - a political step that was
heavily fostered by the U.S .—
'
The integration process
into the European Community provided for the establishment
of a democratic system, which secured U.S. investments and
217 / In 1973 Spain exported 13.8% of its goods to the U.S.
In 1983 the figure dropped to 7.3%. Imports also
decreased from 16% in 1973 to 11.9% a decade later,
in: Europe Yearbook, Vol.I, 1978, p.1117
Vol.II, 1986, p . 2369
218 / Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy, 1984, p.135
219 / see chapter III.B.2
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further safeguarded strategic concerns in the age of the
Cold War. In addition, an EC membership accounted for the
implementation of a market economy which offered investment
opportunities. Thus, the vital interests of the United
States in Spain were secured by Europe. There was no need
for a distinctive financial engagement
.
Additional financial commitments from the United States
were further hampered by the critical bilateral
relationship. The quarrels over base negotiations and
diverging opinion on Latin American issues, such as the
Falklands War and U.S. policies on Nicaragua and El Salvador
weakened the former strong ties.
In short, the Spanish transition was appreciated, but
an active engagement and a fostering of a positive economic
climate was hardly supported - a continuation of the
expedient relation.
B. The Case of Portugal
1 . The Incorporation of the Military Apparatus
In reducing the internal threat which the military
imposed on the establishment of a democratic regime, outside
powers took a variety of actions. In early 1975, with the
background of an unstable political situation and with
communists possessing posts of political power, Portugal was
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excluded from NATO's nuclear planning group which had access
to highly classified material. But the actual membership of
Portugal in the Alliance was never questioned. The United
States had an air base at Lajes in the Azores as well as an
underwater terminal to monitor Soviet submarine movements.
Thus, Portugal was of vital strategical importance for NATO.
The state of a partial exclusion from NATO organs was only
temporary. A return to an entire incorporation followed with
the emergence of a reliable democratic regime.
NATO helped Portugal and in particular President Eanes
in their efforts to promote a new ideological base for the
armed forces
. As opposed to the colonial imperial past with
a heavy military involvement in Africa, the emphasis was now
on the defense of western Europe and the securing of the
democratic regime. In order to pursue this new function, the
military needed to be modernized. After the political
situation was settled the West gradually began to update the
technical equipment of Portugal and to provide military
training
.
Again, the leading role in Europe was played by the
Federal Republic of Germany. With the Social Democratic
party (SPD) in power, West Germany accounted for an arms
transfers of US$ 100 million between 1976 and 1980. While
the U.S. also contributed to the modernization, the role of
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France and Great Britain was only minor in addition,
the United States provided a military assistance of US$ 33.5
million in 1977 and US$ 27.9 million in 1978^7
.
2. Internal Threats
The performance of the Portuguese communist party
created fears among western nations, that the country might
fall under communist influence, further fostered by the
heavy financial support of the Soviet Union. The responses
to this threat to democracy were as follows.
The United States reacted moderately towards the
changes in Portugal. U.S. military bases and diplomatic
posts were never in danger. While in the case of Chile the
country rushed into helping right-wing soldiers to perform a
putsch that would almost certainly have taken place without
any U.S. interference, the Nixon administration was more
cautious in Portugal. With no clear threat to NATO or the
220 / Between 1976 and 1980 France and Great Britian each
provided US$ 5 million.
Source: World Military and Arms Transfers, 1983, p.118
221 / The following figures are according to "AID" (Agency
for International Development)
in 1977 the U.S. provided $ 33.5 million in grants
$ 32.3 million: Military Assistance Program
$ 1.2 million: Military Education and Training
in 1978: $ 27.9 million in grants
$ 25.o million: Military Assistance Program
2.9 million: Military Education and Training
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U.s., Nixon and Kissinger relied on a policy, that would
allow the democratic forces in the military as well as in
other political parties to expose and counterweight the
communist attempts to seize power. Only at the peak of the
struggle for power in the "Hot Summer" of 1975 did the
United States respond to the Soviet aid by ensuring its
support for an evolving democracy. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger strengthened the ties with a democratic Portugal
and explicitly warned the Soviet Union:
Russia should not assume it has the option, eitherdirectly or indirectly, to influence events contrary
to the right of the Portuguese people to determine
their own future
. The involvement of external pressuresfor this purpose in a country which is an old friend
and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of
European security".—7
^ith the prospect that the United States would not accept
any further involvement of the Soviet Union in Portuguese
affairs, Moscow reduced its support. For a short time, an
internal threat of a probable communist influence in
Portugal was transferred in the realm of the antagonism of
the cold war. Some reports suggest, that during this time, a
power struggle took place in the Kremlin with one faction
around KGB chief Alexander Shelepin being in favor of an
intensified involvement, whereas Brezhnev, following the
222 / in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.76
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policy of "detente", feared that the situation might get out
of hand.—7
Kissinger's strict response and his affirmation of
supporting democratic principles might have saved Portugal
from emerging as a conflict zone in the struggle of the two
ambivalent military systems. The firm standpoint of the U.S.
prevented the internal threat of communist participation in
Portuguese politics from developing into an external threat
with international involvement. As long as ideological
implications remained in the realm of domestic politics in
Portugal, the involvement of the United States was low. But
as soon as ideology entered the sphere of an international
confrontation in the age of the cold war, the U.S. response
left no doubt about its sphere of influence.
Not only the CPP, but also other political parties
managed to form linkages to foreign political parties.
Immediately after the coup of April 1974, every party in
Portugal attempted to set up grass roots organizations for
the upcoming bid for political power. Thus, the financial
support of political parties from western European countries
to their sister-organizations in Portugal served as a
counter weight to the extensive financial support of the
Soviet Union to the CPP.
223 / see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.76
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The West-German Social Democratic Party (SPD) took an
especially active role, a position which was inconceivable
for the Federal Republic a few years before. Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt and party chairman Willy Brandt were closely
associated with the chairman of the Portuguese Socialists
Mario Soares through the Socialist International. Despite
the provision of several million dollars, advice and
logistical support from the SPD, Schmidt managed to persuade
the United States that Soares and the Socialists were the
most reliable democratic force in Portugal and therefore
ensured U.S. assistance as well.ffi7
The Associated Press reported on 25 September 1975 that
since June the CIA transferred between two and ten million
dollars per month to Soarez' party Furthermore, minor
contributions to the Portuguese Socialists were given by the
Socialist parties of France and Italy and the Labor Party in
Great Britain.— As far as other political movements are
concerned, the Center Democrats created ties with the
British Conservatives and the French Giscardians. The
Popular Democrats failed to attract attention from any
European Socialist movement and thus decided to refuse any
European connection at all.
224 / see: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.73
225 / in: Kenneth Maxwell, 1982, p.240
226 / in: Robert Harvey, 1978, p.41
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But no other organization could compete with the
support given by the various Socialists parties and in
particular the SPD
. The German Social Democrats contributed
to a large extent to the manifestation of democracy and the
establishment of a liable Portuguese democratic force with a
broad public base and support. The internal threat of
Communism and the initial financial advantage of the CPP in
establishing a party organization was reduced and eventually
extinguished through the fostering of democratic
alternatives
.
In 1972 Portugal signed a Free-Trade-Agreement for
industrial products with the European Community. To the
agreement, tariff reductions concerning Portuguese
agricultural exports were annexed. The document was enlarged
in 1976 by making provision for dismantling trade barriers
for exports from the EC to Portugal and covering new areas
such as technology, financial aid and the positions of
migrant workers.—7 Thus, in 1972, prior to the Revolution
and furthermore in 1976 Portugal created strong ties to
Europe
.
In addition, Great Britain joined the common market in
1972. The United Kingdom was Portugal's most important
foreign market and both countries had been among the states
establishing the European Free Trade Association in 1960.
227/ in: Paulo de Pitta e Cunha, 1983, p.321
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With its most important trading partner now incorporated
into the EC, it was vital for Portugal to further strengthen
its trade relation with the Community. It was therefore a
logical step of the First Provisional Government to ask the
Community for economic support shortly after the coup in
April 1974.
In November 1974, the Third Provisional Government
presented a proposal for a renewal of trade terms under the
Free Trade—Arrangement
. The position of the EC towards these
proposals was reluctant. The regime crises in Portugal in
the aftermath of the first coup which culminated in another
military coup in March 1975 did not indicate the commitment
to democracy necessary for financial support of the EC. By
that time, the economic situation in Portugal worsened.—
During Portugal's "Hot Summer" of 1975 the European
Community still followed its reluctant policy concerning
financial support. France vetoed a community loan in July
1975 for fear of subsidizing a socialist-communist alliance.
The EC Council of the Heads of State and Government stated
that it could only support a pluralist democracy,—7 thus
denying financial assistance. Although the EC Commission had
proposed immediate economic aid to Portugal—7 in June
228 / see chapter III.C.l
229 / Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.31
230/ see: Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.31
119
1975 it took another four months until the Community finally
agreed to grant Portugal a US$ 180 million grant from the
European Investment Bank. By that time, a new social-
democratic government had been in power for three weeks.
Here, the European Community sent a clear signal,
connecting economic issues to political concerns. Economic
aid was not granted without a commitment to democratic
values and the development of democratic institutions which
forced President Gomes to describe the EC attitude as
imical".- With moderate Socialists having taken control
within the AFM and a new provisional government in power
since November 1975 western nations were more willing to
support the Portuguese economy.
Thus, in February 1976 West Germany offered credits of
US$ 250 million, Switzerland and Norway US$ 50 million and
US$ 18 million.—^ Economic assistance further increased
after the first free elections in the summer of 1976. The
more it became obvious that the impact of radicals within
the political process was constantly limited, the more were
foreign powers willing to support Portugal's economic
recovery and therefore its political consolidation. The
United States gave US$ 300 million in credits in February
231 / Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.32
232 / Lester A. Sobel, 1976, p.137.
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1977 and the U.S. and West Germany put together another US$
700 million four months later.
In March 1977, one year after the new Constitution had
been promulgated, Portugal applied for membership in the
European Community. In contrast to the first period of
negotiations with Spain, the EC stressed the political
importance of consolidating democracy in Portugal. The
difference lay in Portugal's membership in NATO. Besides the
economic issue, strategy was at stake. A political
stabilization at the southern flank of the Alliance was
vital for western security. Thus, strategic and security
considerations were almost "automatically invoked in
arguments about EC policies ".—'
'
The process of a full integration however, was not to
be completed until 1986. As in the case of Spain, economic
problems over tariffs and competitive products had to be
solved. Also comparable with its Iberian neighbor was the
Community's financial support. The EC showed a distinctive
commitment to integrate Portugal. The accession negotiations
accounted for the provision of a grant of 700 million ECU,
paid over a period of ten years following 1986, in order to
modernize Portuguese agriculture.—7
233 / Robert Harvey, 1978, p.126
234 / Rainer Eisfeld, 1986, p.34
235 / see: Europa, Vol.II, 1986, p.2164
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Portugal benefited from the incorporation into the
Community. Since 1986, the country's GNP has grown at an
annual rate of 4.3 per cent. The unemployment rate of four
per cent is the lowest in the EC. This was due in part of
the helping hand of the EC in restructuring the industrial
and agrarian sectors. But also, the economic policies of the
new government of Cavaco Silva, which took office in late
1985, fostered this positive tendency. Silva is committed to
an increasing role of private enterprises and to reducing
the levels of unemployment and inflation. Portugal emerged
as an attractive haven for foreign investment due to its
low cost and ultra—product ive labor force"—7
. Portugal
took advantage of the free flow of capital and the reduction
of trade barriers, conditions made possible with EC
integration
.
Similar to their policies in Spain, the United States
regarded Europe as the main responsible actor in the process
of stabilizing the democratic regime in Portugal. But
furthermore, the U.S. regarded Portugal in terms of the
East-West ambivalence and felt very sensitive to eventual
communist influence in the post-authoritarian regimes. Thus,
economic assistance was heavy after it became obvious that
Portugal was following a model of western-type democracies.
236 / in: Forbes Magazine, April 27, 1992, p.118
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Similar to the Community, the United States connected
financial aid to political commitment. In 1974 no economic
assistance at all was given to Portugal. The figures
steadily increased from US$ 15 million in 1975 (US$ 14.3
million in loans) to US$ 338 million in 1978 (only
loans) it was a clear policy by the United States: to
foster the economy of a democratic Portugal and thus to
stabilize the democratic transformation in order to secure
the Southern European flank of the western security system
237 / The figures are according to "AID" (Agency for
International Development)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE
What remains to be done by outside powers to provide
Eastern Europe with a proper security? As seen in the
previous chapters, the examples of the transition period of
Spain and Portugal show important similarities to the
current situation in Eastern Europe, which can be employed
as a useful background in the search for the establishment
of stable democratic systems.
A. Incorporating the Military
Apparatus into Society
The status of the civil-military relations in Eastern
Europe shows remarkable similarities between the three
countries. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
constitutional arrangements provide for a solid civil
supremacy. The armed forces are given an autonomous realm in
strictly military matters, such as training and recruitment
in order to maintain their combat capabilities. The newly
established military academies, responsible for education
and training of future officers, are under military
supervision. Each country took measures to eliminate the
communist impact on the apparatus and all three countries
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based their new military doctrine on the defense of the
nation
.
In addition, Eastern Europe reduced its armies. The
reductions seemed useful, for the defensive orientation of
the new military doctrine as well as the absence of an
ideological enemy makes large armies obsolete. Within the
stringent economic situation, it further relieves the
states' budgets. Also, a reduction in size decreases the
essential costs necessary for the provision of a decent
material standard for the individual soldier.
In comparison, the two Iberian nations responded
similarly to possible internal military threats. Both Spain
and Portugal undertook severe reductions in force. They also
tried to eliminate certain political-ideological influences
on the army
. In the case of Spain, former Franco officers
were ousted. In Portugal, radical officers had to leave the
forces
In addition, the promulgation of new constitutions
enhanced civil supremacy with the special case of Portugal,
where the military has a traditional tendency to interact in
politics. General Eanes, although a pro-democratic officer,
symbolized the involvement of the military by holding the
powerful position of the President until 1986.
But the essential malfunction in the civil-military
relations in Eastern Europe is in the cognitive aspect, the
need to make the armed forces feel integrated within the new
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society. In terms of a new military doctrine all three
countries emphasize the defending of the nation. In the case
of Poland the military also stresses the long military
tradition mixed with a certain amount of national pride. But
the military in all of Eastern Europe is confronted with a
skeptical population. The public attitude towards the army
is shaped by forty years of communism, in which the military
-although curtailed- never challenged the regimes and was
reduced to a political actor of minimal influence. This lack
in public support represents a cognitive deficit in the
identities of the Eastern European militaries. As yet they
do not feel integrated and respected as a vital element of a
democratic system. This perception has the potency to
transform into an alienation of the apparatus from society,
which can generate into an internal challenge and threat to
the democratic system.
The Iberian cases serve as useful comparisons. Spain
gives a rich example on how to integrate the armed forces
and on how to provide them with a new ideological base. The
Spanish armed forces were largely segregated from the
democratization process in society. It kept its old
traditions and values and was not able to adapt to the rapid
cultural and political transformation. But NATO served as a
partial solution. The army was incorporated into an
institution that provided a bedrock for the military
doctrine -the defense of the country within the realm of
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western nations. Furthermore, this newly found identity
distracted the military from an involvement in internal
political matters.
As mentioned above, the military in Portugal has a
historical role for political intervention, while the
Presidency has supreme authority and is traditionally open
to a military officer. Nevertheless, NATO at least served as
a buffer, as an additional arena, where the military found
an identity and ideological base in contributing to the
security of the western world.
The situation in Eastern Europe is similar. First, the
prospect of alienated armies is apparent and second, the
transformation into an open and democratic society has the
tendency to contradict traditional values and attitudes of
the conservative military mind.—7
The integration of the armies of Eastern Europe into a
broader military concept can have the same effect as
compared to the case of the Spanish armed forces. It became
an integral part of the democratic system -as a servant and
not as a threat. The question is whether NATO can provide
the same identity to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as
it did to the Iberian nations.
An entire incorporation into the Alliance would serve
the purpose of an external orientation of the military in
238 / for a discussion on the military mind and ethic see:
Samuel Huntington, 1959, 59-65
Amos Perlmutter, 1977, p.25-40
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the realm of western democracies. But several aspects
prevent a complete adaptation of the Iberian experiences.
First, an entire incorporation would leave the
democratization processes of Russia and the other republics
of the former Soviet Union isolated. This step would
represent a setback for these nations and an exclusion from
the integration process of Europe, a double-edged policy
with two different standards.
Second, with full integration, NATO and Eastern Europe
would be confronted with additional financial costs due to
an adaptation to NATO—standards in terms of eguipment and
training and the logistical costs to fulfill specific tasks
in the Alliance.
Third, although the possibility of alienated armies in
Eastern Europe should be taken seriously, the current
situation gives no indications of a counterrevolution or a
coup, further enhanced by the guarantee of civil supremacy
in terms of institutional and constitutional arrangements.
Portugal and Spain provided a cognitive base in an
abrupt way through the help of NATO. The Alliance
represented an ideological transmitter for the Iberian
nations. The urge to integrate the Spanish military was
pressing after various coups. In Portugal, the armed forces
played a key role during the revolution and needed to be
distracted from internal politics to give way to democratic
institutions. From the early beginnings of the transition to
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democracy, the lack of cognitive bases for the militaries in
both countries represented a threat.
But the situation in Eastern Europe is different. The
militaries so far have not demanded or attempted an
involvement in internal politics. Moreover, they do not
exert a significant influence on the democratization
processes. Thus, the formation of an identity for the
Eastern European militaries is not as urgent as it was in
the cases of the Iberian nations. Therefore, Hungary, Poland
and Czechoslovakia do not necessarily need a military
organization to offer a cognitive base for their armed
forces. The mutual adaptation of the civil and military
sectors of society can be given the necessary time in order
to establish the mutual perception that both sectors are
vital for a secure democracy.
Still, the sole function of defending the country bears
the danger of an orientation towards internal matters. The
militaries of Eastern Europe are in need of an international
outlook and connection, which is related to their security
function of safeguarding their nations. Here, outside powers
can provide assistance. International cooperation within the
realm of democratic societies would distract from internal
political matters. It would provide for an exchange with
armies from established democratic societies and would
therefore give the theoretical ideology of defending the
nation a practical notion. Mutual exchanges in the field of
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military education and training, participation in maneuvers,
technological assistance are among such measures. The
provision of a new cognitive base is achieved through an
integration within the western world. In the cases of Spain
and Portugal, NATO served this purpose. But in Eastern
Europe, cooperation, assistance, and advice are capable of
fulfilling this function.
As argued in chapter II, the military needs to be
professional to fulfill its security function. Thus, the
technological standard of the Eastern European armies has to
be upgraded in order to be effective. In the context of
bilateral cooperation, outside powers should recall the
assistance given to Portugal and Spain. The Carter and
Reagan administrations helped the young democracies in
bringing the military equipment on a higher standard and
further financed military-educational training. France
entered into a bilateral military agreement with Spain,
while Germany established working groups with Spain and gave
financial assistance for the modernization of the Portuguese
military
.
One might say that these measures by western powers
were designed to increase the effectiveness of NATO in
general. But they also had a particular impact on Spain and
Portugal. The modernization contributed to the aspect of
identity. New equipment had a psychological effect on the
military, for it actually benefited from the change in
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regimes. This further fostered the integration processes of
the Iberian militaries into the realm of democratic
societies
.
Although they are not members of NATO, this aspect is
nevertheless relevant to the cases of Eastern Europe.
Financial assistance and cooperation in the field of
equipment and technology would increase the effectiveness of
the Eastern European armies and would make the militaries
more responsive to the new democratic systems. In addition
it would consolidate contacts and strengthen ties between
East and West
.
So far, the United States provides assistance for
Eastern Europe in the field of military-educational
training. A comparison with the assistance given to
Spain (chapter IV. A. 1) and Portugal (chapter IV.B.l)
earlier, however, shows the limited engagement of the United
States in Eastern Europe.
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_/ In the fiscal year 1992, each of the three Eastern
European countries received an estimated 75,000 US$. In
the fiscal year of 1991, the figures were 310,000 for
Czechoslovakia, 275,000 for Hungary and 407,000 for
Poland; according to "AID"
(Agency for International Development)
240 / The lack of available data on the engagement of the EC
and its member states makes a conclusion on European
outside powers obsolete.
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B. Internal Threats
1 . Economic Problems
As discussed above, the consequences of the economic
performances of the particular countries are twofold. The
securance of a decent material standard for the individual
soldiers reduces the threat of a military intervention.
Also, the distribution of wealth and the provision of
economic benefits to broad sectors of society eases social
tensions. As seen in chapter III.A.l. Eastern Europe is
suffering from various economic setbacks, which hinder the
implementation of a market economy. High inflation,
unemployment, price increases and a low industrial output
are the current distinctive marks.
This research is not able to offer solutions in
handling the economic crises. Numerous economists and
western financial expertise discussed and offered various
approaches, often with only slight success. Instead, this
research hopes to contribute to the discussion through a
comparative look at Spain and Portugal.
The similarities between Iberia and Eastern Europe are
compelling. Both suffered from their inherited economic
system, with insufficient structures. In both cases
capitalist management and financial skill were either
limited or absent. Spain and Portugal were dependent on
foreign investment, capital and technology. The two Iberian
nations were not able to consolidate their economies and
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thus to stabilize their regimes without foreign help. Spain
and Portugal were able to create a "European connection",
through an increase in trade relations and eventually with
the accession to the EC. Europe was the safeguard for
economic recovery and therefore fostered democracy on the
Iberian peninsula.
Today, the same prospect is valid for Eastern Europe.
Only with the help of outside powers can the region provide
an acceptable material standard so vital for its security
and for the stabilization of democracy.
In Eastern Europe, the process of a transformation from
a socialist into a capitalist economy is hampered by the
lack of historic experiences which would provide guidance.
It requires western expertise and market experience. Outside
powers, which include European as well as non—European
nations, can provide assistance on three levels: sub-
governmental actors, the individual governments and supra-
national organizations, such as the EC, the IMF or the World
Bank
.
On the sub-governmental level private enterprises need
to take action. The private sectors of western countries can
arrange technology transfers and joint-venture programs. All
three Eastern European countries lack a proper banking
system, a vital element, not only for the economic
infrastructure but also for the provision of credits and for
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the modernization of Eastern European companies. So far,
private banks are engaged in Eastern Europe through the
development of representative offices, the involvement in
joint venture banks, investments in the leasing and
insurance market and the training of bank managers which
provides for a know-how input. But private banks are opposed
to take over the responsibility in financing the necessary
economic reforms. In this context. Eastern Europe needs to
address international financial institutions and western
governments .—7
Tourism functioned as a booming sector in the economic
progress of Spain and Portugal. An adequate tourist
infrastructure already exists only in some parts in Eastern
Europe (Budapest, the Balaton region, Prague)
. Although
Eastern Europe might not evolve into a target for mass
tourism, the region undoubtedly has a sufficient
attractiveness
. Cultural ties of former refugees, now living
in western Europe, and the restricted travel opportunities
during communist rule produce an interest and a curiosity
for visiting the region.
Tourism offers open space for investment. Apart from
the economic benefits, the Iberian societies were exposed to
western lifestyles prior to the departure from authoritarian
rule which helped pave the road for the democratic
transition
.
241 / see: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, pp.331
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Tourism and therefore also western culture had a
significant impact on Eastern Europe. As far as they could
penetrate the iron curtain, the general confrontation with
western lifestyles and behavior and the display of wealth
exposed the economic and materialistic weaknesses of the
communist system. Capitalism and western culture set a
normative standard, whilst the realization of this material
dream represented one cause to start the revolutionary
transformation
.
It remains arguable if this cultural exposure should be
regarded as a positive experience, but in Spain and Portugal
it undoubtedly represented a break with the authoritarian
past and an integration within the western world.
So far, western companies and entrepreneurs seek their
chances in opening businesses in Eastern Europe. Four
decades of a state-run economy left plenty of consumer
niches for investment. As of October 1992, U.S. estimates
account for 300 U.S. businesses operating in
Czechoslovakia.—7 Between September 1991 and April 1992,
total U.S. investment in Czechoslovakia amounted to US$ 1.3
billion.—'7 In Hungary, foreign investment of US$ 1.5
billion poured into the country in 1991.— Various
investment opportunities and an expanding market attract
242 / New York Times, October 21, 1992, p.Dl
243 / New York Times, June 21, 1992, Section 3, p.l
244 / New York Times, May 03, 1992, p.F5
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are
foreign money. Still, market capitalism and investment
often hampered and even distracted by an inefficient
bureaucracy and sometimes confusing legal restrictions and
obligations
.
On the governmental level, apart from financial
assistance, the western world can offer inexpensive help -
advice. The experience of the "Treuhandanstalt " in Germany
with the unification process in terms of privatization can
be of high importance to Eastern Europe. Furthermore it
would involve highly qualified western expertise. Western
countries can advise Eastern Europe in establishing an
adequate and functioning administration, especially in the
public sector. Western governments can also foster a proper
economic climate by giving export guarantees and by granting
tax benefits to companies investing in Eastern Europe.
As Joseph Pozsgai—'7 suggested, Hungary, but also
Czechoslovakia, deserve a restructuring of their foreign
debts. It seems rather cynical that new regimes, devoted to
human rights, democracy and market economy have to take over
the debts inherited by communist dictatorship. In this
context, The Polish effort for a redefinition has succeeded.
The foreign debtors remitted 50 per cent, the United States
even 70 per cent of the Polish debt in March 1991 .—'
'
Debt
245 / Joseph Pozsgai, 1991, p.123
246 / see: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.327
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rescheduling and remission for Hungary and Poland remains to
be done
.
According to Klaus Schroeder, the total volume of debt
will rise significantly. At the end of 1995, Czechoslovakia
would have to pay US? 1.1 billion, Poland US? 4 billion and
Hungary US$ 2.5 billion.^ Pozsgai therefore suggests
that Eastern Europe should be granted a moratorium on
repayment of five to seven years, to concentrate all
economic forces on the privatization-^ which represents
the biggest obstacle to economic progress.
So far, individual countries seem rather reluctant in
their financial support. The United States for instance did
not provide any economic or development assistance in the
fiscal years of 1990 and 1991 through its "Agency of
International Development". In September 1991, the "U.S
Information Agency" and "AID" announced an US$ 18 million
program involving 32 colleges with the aim of training
faculty in management and market economics. An additional
US $ 45 million was invested in a program by the American
business and private sector .112/ it seems that the
247 / in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.334
Schroeder added all aggregate capital transfers
-either
planned or already in progress- of international
financial organizations and western governments. His
estimate is based on the current interest rates.
248 / Joseph Pozsgai, 1991, p.123
249 / U.S Department of State Dispatch:
September 2, 1991, p.662; April 8, 1991, p.247
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individual countries follow a policy of rendering the
responsibility to supra-national organizations such as the
IMF, the World Bank or the European Community, m this
context, no data on bilateral cooperations was available.
On the supra-national level, the IMF provides extensive
funds to its new members of Eastern Europe. In addition, the
World Bank also launched credit programs .121' The European
Community however has to fulfill the most important part in
improving the Eastern European economies. For the fostering
of the economic progress, a close cooperation with Eastern
Europe is essential. No other model provides such economic
prosperity than the EC. The Community has the experience,
expertise, as well as the institutions for a political
dialogue and a closer cooperation on the governmental level.
It is the "world's greatest trading power and the world's
most generous provider for development aid" .-^l7
For Spain and Portugal, the accession into the EC
represented the strongest and most effective link of their
European connection". Would, however an accession of
Eastern Europe achieve the same merits
-democratic
250./ The IMF-agreements are scheduled for 1992 until 1994.
Within this period Poland receives US$ 2.5 billion,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia US$ 1.8 billion.
The World Bank plans a US$ 10 billion credit limit for
the entire region; in: Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.332
251 / Werner Ungerer, 1990, p.227
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integration and economic recovery- as it did for the Iberian
nations?
The Community finds itself in a crisis with crumpling
currencies, economic setbacks and public opposition in
several member states against the unification process. In
terms of an accession of Eastern Europe, two opposing
attitudes collide: "intensification" versus
enlargement
. The prospects of a new European order
are within two extremes. On one side a highly integrated EC
of twelve, with a hegemonic position over the rest of Europe
and on the other side a greater EC, almost identical with
the European CSCE members
.
The accession question is not limited to the Eastern
European countries. The already submitted applications of
Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and
Finland must also be taken into account
. An enlargement of
the EC would then mean at least 22 members.
Under these circumstances it is extremely doubtful
whether the envisaged goal of a European Union can be
achieved.—7 The development of a common foreign policy,
common military policy and common currency as set forth by
the "Maastricht-treaty " would be hard to accomplish. A
greater EC of 22 members will hardly go beyond the
integration level of an enlarged free trade area. The
252 / see: Gerhard Wettig, 1992, p.236
253 / see: Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.13
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additional costs for an extension might also strain the
countries' budget and might therefore result in a negative
response among the people towards the concept of Europe in
general
.
On the other side, an intensification of the Community
of the "Twelve" would prolong the division of Europe. Such a
denial of an accession for Eastern Europe would leave the
possibility of an emergence of a zone of instability which
can be neither in the European security nor in its economic
interest. To face the current challenges the EC therefore is
in need of a fundamental change. As a compromise, a proposal
by Heinz Kramer from the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik"
in Germany calls for a
"European system of varying integrated circles", ...
where ... "economically weaker states could be
incorporated into internal market integration via
catching-up models designed in analogy to the envisaged
EMU-EC, without having to fully fulfill their
functional criteria.—7
With the establishment of the core European Monetary Union,
the EC would represent the most integrated circle, which
could then be followed with a similar differentiation and
varying membership circles towards a political union. This
could account for a relatively early, although limited
incorporation of Eastern Europe.
254 / Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.19
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Whatever the future direction of the EC will be, the
Community has to clarify its position. A 12-member European
intensification and a broad European integration process are
irreconcilable under the current concept of a European
Union. However, a very close cooperation and integration is
vital for Eastern Europe. "Go West" is the only solution for
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Their economies cannot
develop by relying mainly on internal trade among the three
or with the republics of the former Soviet Union or with
other former members of the defunct WTO. All of these
countries are themselves confronted with enormous problems.
They are not in the position to provide an economic boost.
The Community has to take over or at least share the
responsibility. It is the most decisive force on which
economic prosperity and thus a political stabilization is
dependent on
.
So far, the association agreements (also called
"European agreements"), negotiated in early 1992 with
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia illustrate the EC's
dilemma in choosing between "intensification" or
"enlargement". The treaties represent a middle way between
these two poles. The question of a subsequent membership is
deliberately kept open. Priority is given to "efforts to
promote the integration of these countries into the western-
style international economic and political system" / The
255 / Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.14
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EC will remove trade barriers to give access for Eastern
European industrial goods. But restrictions in the
agricultural sector and for sensitive industrial goods
(textiles, iron, steel and coal) undermine this generous
effort. The treaty further mentions technical
assistance, training and education, the promotion of
scientific research and technological development; measures
designed to support structural change.—7 The efforts by
the EC show a remarkable ambition to help and integrate
Eastern Europe. But this current willingness has to be
transformed into a long-term cooperation to overcome the
economic problems.
Here, a look at past experiences seems appropriate. In
Spain negotiations for accession were almost in vain, for
the new regime did not manage to incorporate the military
into the democratic society. Apart from the loss of an
ideological base, economic and material aspects accounted
for a number of coups.
The European Community was initially reluctant to
support the new Spanish democracy. With negotiations for an
accession virtually deadlocked, Spain questioned its future
and position within Europe. The military was opposed to the
256 / see: Heinz Kramer, 1992, p.15
257 / In addition the "European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development" provides credit of approx. US$ 16 billion
(1992 to 1999) in: Klaus Schroeder, 1992, p.333.
142
"westernization" of society, while the government and the
people threw doubt upon the necessity of NATO for Spain
It was not until the meetings in Dublin in 1984, nine
years after Franco's death, that the community gave a strong
sign of support with the prospect of accession. In this
period, the European commitment to integrate Spain was
vague. It resulted in various internal crises.
The situation in Eastern Europe has similar potentials.
The region needs a democratic anchor, needs assistance and
guidance. A lack of support, a delay of the integration
process into Europe and a struggling economy can severely
test the patience of a country in terms of the acceptance of
the political and economic systems.
In this context, the EC should bridge the period of
accession by acting as a chairman of emergency, and create a
fund designed for guick assistance The years of regime
crises and coups in Spain in the early 1980 's showed that
determined action by outside powers is necessary to prevent
a surrender of the new members of the free world to
despotism and authoritarianism.
258 / Klaus Schroeder, 1991, p.335
This "Stability Fund for Europe" should be set up by
the European Bank for Recovery and Development"
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2^_ Rejection of Capitalism and Apathy towards Democr^y
The current rejection of Capitalism and the apathy
towards the democratization process in Eastern Europe are
clear signs that people are disappointed over the outcome,
especially their own personal, political and material
benefits of the revolutions. Rejection and apathy are
negative and almost nihilistic attitudes. The optimistic
spirit of the revolutionary days changed into passivity. The
benefits of the new economic and political concepts differ
widely from the people's expectations at the outset of the
revolutions. These tendencies ultimately threaten the new
regimes. They will increase with economic failure, and
political surrender of democracy becomes more likely.
The success story of West —Germany ' s departure from the
Nazi-dictatorship offers an appropriate example. The
economic prosperity represented the backbone of the new
German democracy. Broad parts of society benefited from
Capitalism. Although the completion of the economic miracle
took fifteen years, a positive perception of the economic
performance existed from the early 1950 's on. "Things are
looking up" was the motto of the post war era and
transformed into a solid acceptance of democracy. The
individual's economic benefits provided for an approval of
the organizing principles of society: Democracy and
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Capitalism .— in West-Germany
,
positive economic
performances had a powerful impact on the establishment and
the approval of democracy.
It takes time to turn people, used to authoritarian
rule for four decades, into citizens who approve the
transformation and who are convinced that Democracy and
Capitalism serve their needs best. The case of Portugal
shows that apathy, the glorification of the past and
traditional, authoritarian modes of behavior serve as a
hotbed for populist movements and anti-democratic notions.
But Portugal also showed that these tensions decrease with a
positive economic performance that grants economic benefits
to the citizens.
Economic prosperity is not an exclusive guarantor of
democracy but it undoubtedly fosters its establishment.
Capitalism and Democracy are intertwined. A democratic
political system can rely on public support, when it
produces economic prosperity and provides for a wide
distribution of wealth to broad parts of society.
The public approval of Capitalism and Democracy is so
far limited in Eastern Europe. The task is to legitimize
259 / This material orientation in establishing a new society
culminated in an identity crisis in the late 1960 's.
Intellectuals as well as the Student revolts of 1968
criticized the exclusiveness of the new materialistic
cognitive base, which limited the confrontation with
the Nazi-past and prevented the transformation of the
authoritarian German character into democratic values
and attitudes.
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them, in order to wipe away possible intentions to a return
to authoritarian forms of government. This task oannot be
— *—
- -gary and Csechoslovakta aione. *
asks for help and cooperation. For decades, the European
continent was divided into two spheres. History offered the
people of Europe a unique chance: to unite not only Germany,
but the whole of Europe. A close cooperation, financial and
personal assistance and an economic integration within the
established capitalist economies of Europe are just the
first steps, but they are essential to achieve this goal.
-3_i Ethnonat ionalism
As illustrated by the Spanish case, institutional
arrangements which grant a decent amount of autonomy are one
way to ease tensions. But political violence still is a
severe problem for the country, in addition, cooperation
served as a further means to reduce the threat to the
Spanish democracy.
Here, the institutions of the EC are ill-equipped. The
EC represents an arena for consultation and political
dialogue on the highest governmental levels. Although the
Maastricht-treaty calls for a increased anti-terrorist
cooperation, its institutions, however, lack the authority
to manage rising ethnic tensions or conflicts in Eastern
Europe
.
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Its task is the
The same applies to NATO. provision of
a broad security agenda and does not address solutions for
regional problems. The need for a new security organization
becomes apparent, when looking at the current security
threats to Europe which show hardly any resemblance to the
threats that NATO was confronted with in its founding days.
Here a proposal by Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer for
a further development of the CSCE seems appropriate 15°'.
The CSCE includes all members of NATO, the defunct Warsaw
Pact and most of Europe's neutrals. Until recently, the CSCE
was limited to meetings on security, economic and human
rights issues .—7 According to Flynn and Scheffer, the
CSCE has to gain more power and influence through the
creation of a secretariat and its own peace keeping forces.
The CSCE would provide an intergovernmental forum with
specific councils which have the ability to address specific
issues, related to the region's problems, that cannot be
covered by the overarching NATO-structure
. Councils would
include cooperation on military and environmental issues as
well as on ethnic affairs.
Also, the recent establishment of the new Conflict
Prevention Center has a high potency. The Center's current
focus is on a limited range of military matters, such as
information on military forces and their activities, and
260 / Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, 1990, p.77-101
261 / Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.137
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military budgets. But it could broaden its agenda by
addressing internal practices or the treatment of minorities
which might threaten the peace, thus urging moderation and
communication.^' An additional proposal envisages the
Center as an arena for politico-military security matters,
with arms control and disarmament measures .111/
Furthermore, the organization would not undermine NATO
-the Alliance would still be regarded as the "bedrock of
Western security"^ and a new CSCE would provide a
framework to integrate the former Soviet republics and to
absorb Germany. Finally, as a voting member in the CSCE, the
United States would be directly involved in finding
solutions for the regions. Due to the paramount significance
of an economic recovery, the main task of reducing the
internal threats to democracy has to be fulfilled by
European nations, for Europe is equipped with the most
suitable institution, the EC. But Europe would be foolish to
renounce a U.S. American assistance and cooperation.
Knowledge, technological and economic capabilities and a
long experience in fostering European democracies can do no
harm to the democratization process in Eastern Europe. CSCE
would provide such an arena for the contribution of the
United States.
262 / Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.139
263 / Michael Alexander, 1991, p.12
264 / Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, 1990, p.95
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—
—External Threats
Due to the absence of external threats, the Iberian
do not offer any suggestions. The external threats in
Eastern Europe are related to the unstable and so far
unpredictable development processes in the new republics of
the former Soviet Union and in the bordering countries of
the former allies of the Warsaw pact.
Some scholars have suggested that NATO should not be tempted
to get involved in Eastern Europe. "Bringing East European
states under at least the Alliance's political umbrella,
would isolate Moscow,
.
. . making Europe less secure in the
long run
.
But the integration of the former Soviet republics
within the CSCE limits the prospect of isolation, in case
NATO focuses on Eastern Europe. Instead, various security
matters have to be handled by the CSCE, which still has the
potency to evolve as a framework for integrating Russia and
the republics into a European security. Second, the various
democratization processes in the former USSR are as yet
incomplete, whereas Eastern Europe had undergone significant
personal, ideological and constitutional changes. It should
be essential for the free world to secure and safeguard
their development.
Therefore, the only solution to close this security gap
is NATO. The Alliance is needed as a stabilizing factor in
265 / Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.134
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the region. It would further provide the United States with
a role as "arbiter and balancing power" .Iff/ NATO is an
essential forum for political consultation and currently the
only body in which the United States as well as Canada sit
down alongside with European countries. Its military
capability is still a crucial contribution to the European
security. The existing institutions in Europe are themselves
too weak to guarantee a stable security. The recent example
of Yugoslavia indicates that neither the CSCE nor the
European Community had the capability to control the crisis.
The situation in Russia is highly unpredictable.
Although the country is pursuing the path towards democracy,
the process is far from being secure. Changes in the regime
type and the political system are still possible and need to
be taken in account when referring to a proper Eastern
European security. The CSCE therefore cannot function as a
substitute for NATO, since Russia has a veto over CSCE
actions
The Maastricht-treaty
,
its rejection by a Danish
referendum and the close public referendum in France showed
that the shape and timing of a European unity are still
uncertain. In this context, the role of the Western European
Union (WEU) needs further clarification. The Maastricht-
treaty calls for a European defense system that is separated
2 6 6 / Henry Kissinger, 1992, p.19
267/ Jenonne Walker, 1991, p.140
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but still "linked" to NATO and open to all members to the EC
as an expanded version of the WEU.-^7 Also, France and
Germany announced the formation of an operational corps of
35.000 men by 1995 and asked the members of the WEU to
join .—7
It seems essential for Europe to create its own defense
system that will eventually succeed Nato as the safeguard
for European security
. Europe has to take over more
responsibilities in light of its gradual evolution into an
economic super power and due to a possible withdrawal of
American troops. However, only confusion exists over the
various proposals and initiatives. So far, Europe remains
incapable of closing the security gap. The Gulf War in 1991
showed the inadequate response of Europe. Thus, European
action on security as well as the development of a defence
identity are so far limited.—7
Furthermore, united Germany emerged as a continental
political and economic superpower. France and Great Britain
are both too weak to stop an eventual expansion of German
nationalism over Europe and especially over its eastern
part. As Henry Kissinger noted, "Germany has become so
strong, that existing European institutions cannot by
268 / in: Washington Post, December 11, 1991, p.A30
269 / in: New York Times, May 23, 1992, p.Al
270/ see: Michael Alexander, 1991, p.13
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themselves establish a balance between Germany and its
partners" .122/
NATO is also needed to provide Eastern Europe with a
guarantee against other external threats that might evolve
from the unstable situation in Byelorussia, the Ukraine,
Lithuania, Russia and Romania. Only NATO would give
reasonable answers to these security questions. As discussed
in chapter V.A. a full incorporation of the Eastern European
militaries is not applicable. But this does not exclude the
possibility that NATO should give Eastern Europe a security
guarantee, while border violations should be judged as a
challenge to western security.
Lately, the Alliance took a more active position in
responding to the vital political changes. Together with
five members from the former Warsaw Bloc and with eight of
the fifteen former Soviet republics, NATO founded the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. It functions
mainly as a forum at the level of foreign ministers to
discuss military reductions and to coordinate security
policies between the states as a means of creating greater
stability
Also, NATO agreed to take over a peace-keeping role in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 222/ But its
271 / Henry Kissinger, 1992, p.19
272 / see: New York Times, June 06, 1991, p.A5
273 / see: New York Times, June 05, 1992, p.l
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commitment is limited. First, NATO will only take action
when asked to do so by the CSCE. But with a veto power by
Russia, emerging security threats caused by Moscow would not
be covered. Second, a complete security guarantee would have
a preventive-deterrent element, m its communique however,
NATO is only willing to counteract security threats on a
case-by-case basis.
In search of a new role in the aftermath of the cold
war, NATO took a small step towards a readjustment of its
European security concept. From the ideological
confrontation of two opposing state societies, it narrowed
its focus to a particular region and probably to individual
states that are not directly integrated within its
structure. With its enemy the Warsaw Pact gone, the
safeguarding of the East-European democratization processes
can serve as a new function for the Alliance.
In addition, NATO accounts for the involvement of the
United States in the democratic transformation of the
Eastern European countries. Through NATO the U.S. can
provide some assurance against any eventual expansionism
from the republics of the former Soviet Union. The role of
NATO is crucial. The Alliance must help in keeping the level
of external threats as low as possible. This reduction of
external pressure would in return decrease internal
tensions
. With a supportive NATO, Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia need not enlarge their militaries and would
153
enable them to direct more resources towards
problems
.
internal
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